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SMART GROWTH:  THE LARGE LAW FIRM 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Eli Wald*
INTRODUCTION  
 
The large law firm has long been the subject of many a study, due to its 
elite rank atop the legal profession,1 its dominant position both in terms of 
the number of lawyers affiliated with it and its significant share of the 
national and global market for legal services,2 and because information 
about it is relatively accessible.3  Recent interest in the future of the large 
firm has been more practical in nature:  whereas before the Great 
Recession, large law firms were systematically growing, hiring one out of 
every four law school graduates as entry-level associates,4 the downturn 
brought stagnation and reduction in the size of large firms and its aftermath 
ushered in an ongoing period of uncertainty and instability.5  Are large law 
firms likely to experience renewed growth domestically and globally?  Will 
they revert back to massive hiring of entry-level attorneys?  Or have large 
law firms entered a new era of decline, even eventual death?6
 
*  Charles W. Delaney Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  I 
thank Arthur Best, John Flood, Bryant Garth, Bruce Green, Russ Pearce, Carole Silver, 
David Wilkins, and participants in Fordham University School of Law’s colloquium on 
Globalization and the Legal Profession sponsored by the Stein Center for Law and Ethics in 
October 2011 for their insightful comments.  A special thanks to Diane Burkhardt, Faculty 
Services Liaison at the Westminster Law Library at the University of Denver Sturm College 
of Law, for her outstanding research assistance.   
 
 1. See generally Robert L. Nelson, Of Tournaments and Transformations:  Explaining 
the Growth of Large Law Firms, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 733 (book review). 
 2. See generally AM. BAR FOUND. & NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH AND 
EDUC., AFTER THE JD II:  SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 
(2009); Eli Wald, Foreword:  The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2051 (2010). 
 3. In the early 1980s, journals such as the American Lawyer began collecting and 
systematically publishing information about compensation at large law firms. See Eli Wald, 
Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics:  Resolving the Tension Between Confidentiality 
Requirements and Contemporary Lawyers’ Career Paths, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 199, 258 
(2007).  In addition, organizations such as the Association for Legal Career Professionals 
(NALP) regularly gather and publish information about the hiring and promotion patterns of 
large law firms. See, e.g., Minorities & Women, NALP, http://www.nalp.org/
minoritieswomen (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 4. Aric Press, Annual Survey Shows the New Reality of Associate Life, TEXAS LAW. 
ONLINE, Aug. 10, 2007. 
 5. Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle:  Economic Perspectives on the 
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 29–37; Wald, 
supra note 2, at 2051–52. 
 6. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749. 
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Notwithstanding the significant scholarly attention the large law firm has 
received,7 we know little about its organization, management, and growth 
patterns, and therefore cannot predict its future.  Indeed, because we still do 
not know why large law firms grow,8
Leading commentators have bemoaned the lack of sufficient empirical 
study of the legal profession and its various constituencies.
 it is hard to speculate whether they 
will continue to grow, and if so, how and to what extent. 
9  Yet when it 
comes to the large law firm, the problem may be as much with what we 
think we know about the large firm as it is with what we do not know.10
Offering a detailed case study of one Am Law 200 firm, this Article 
questions some of the basic assumptions and predictions of the standard 
story, suggesting that large law firms may be able to move from a narrow 
emphasis on corporate law and the service of large corporate entities to 
more diversified practice areas and client bases; to transition from an 
associate-heavy attorney pool to a partner-heavy model; and shift from 
brittle, organic growth models to smart, strategic alternatives.  
  
This Article argues that a “standard story of the large law firm” has 
emerged to explain the growth of the large firm, an account by now so well 
accepted that it hardly gets challenged or revisited.  This standard account, 
however, fails to adequately describe the actual rich and vibrant world of 
large law firms.  Instead, it only explains a subset of the large law firm 
universe, the old Wall Street elite firms and their progeny.  A key, 
therefore, to understanding the complex world of large law firms, is to 
broaden the scope of inquiry and move past the standard account as a one-
size-fits-all explanation for the rise and growth of the large firm. 
I.  THE “STANDARD STORY” OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM:   
LAWYER-CENTRIC GROWTH MODELS 
The standard story—often referred to as the “Cravath System,” after Paul 
Cravath of the eponymous law firm, whom many credit with leading the 
 
 7. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The 
Elastic Tournament:  A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867 
(2008); Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1803 (2008); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers:  
Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law 
Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998). 
 8. See Burk & McGowan, supra note 5, at 6–7 (rejecting various models for large law 
firm growth, and proposing two new theories to explain growth). 
 9. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of Professional Schools, 
49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24 (1999); David B. Wilkins, The Professional Responsibility of 
Professional Schools to Study and Teach About the Profession, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76 (1999). 
 10. See Carole Silver, What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us:  The Need for Empirical 
Research in Regulating Lawyers and Legal Services in the Global Economy, 43 AKRON L. 
REV. 1009, 1016 n.19 (2010) (“This debate [over multijurisdictional practice] is difficult to 
resolve, in large part, because of the absence of empirical evidence about how the 
elimination of jurisdictional restrictions would affect law practice in the United States, and 
the inability to obtain such evidence without authorizing national practice.” (quoting ABA 
CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, FINAL REPORT OF COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL 
PRACTICE, CLIENT REPRESENTATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 16 (2002))). 
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first large U.S. law firm—emerged in vanity press accounts of the founding 
and growth of elite Wall Street large law firms,11 and was followed by 
pioneering work by Erwin Smigel,12 Jerold Auerbach,13 and Paul 
Hoffman.14  It was cemented in place as the standard account of large law 
firm growth by Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay’s seminal study, 
Tournament of Lawyers, published in 1991.15
The “tournament of lawyers” model purports to explain the organization, 
structure, and growth patterns of large corporate law firms serving large for-
profit entity clients.  The large law firm emerged in the late nineteenth 
century to serve the business interests of large entity clients.  Experienced 
lawyers with an excess of cultural and social capital such as skill, expertise, 
and connections—partners—came together to form law firms that offered 
an increasingly specialized one-stop shop for entity clients with a focus on 
business law and transactional work.  The firms trained inexperienced 
lawyers with an excess of labor—associates—and after a probation period 
either promoted the junior attorneys to partnership or helped them be placed 
elsewhere.   
   
Such tournament for partnership organization addresses three concerns 
that partners have about associates:  grabbing (for example, usurping the 
partners’ clients and expertise), leaving (quitting after obtaining valuable 
training and before the firm can capitalize on its investment in training and 
mentoring), and shirking (putting in the hours but not working as hard or as 
effectively as possible), by providing associates with incentives to avoid 
such opportunistic behavior.16
 
 11. See, e.g., LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN:  POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL 
EMPIRE (1993); NANCY LISAGOR & FRANK LIPSIUS, A LAW UNTO ITSELF:  THE UNTOLD STORY 
OF THE LAW FIRM SULLIVAN & CROMWELL (1988); ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM 
AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819–1947 (1948).  Some law firms feature autobiographies or 
biographies of a founding or influential partner in their history and growth. See, e.g., 
ARTHUR L. LIMAN WITH PETER ISRAEL, LAWYER:  A LIFE OF COUNSEL AND CONTROVERSY 
(1998) (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison); JOSEPH M. PROSKAUER, A SEGMENT OF 
MY TIMES (1950). 
  The years-long probation period limits 
associates’ access to the partners’ human capital early on in their tenure 
with the firm, reducing grabbing opportunities.  The deferred compensation 
 12. ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER:  PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? 
(1964). 
 13. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:  LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICA (1976). 
 14. PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET:  THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GREAT WALL 
STREET LAW FIRMS (1973). 
 15. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 7; see also Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 7.  This is 
not to belittle the contributions of early pioneers of empirical study of the profession, see, 
e.g., JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS:  A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1966); 
JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:  THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE BAR (1982); DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS:  THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON 
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1990); or of scholars who examined the large law firm, see, e.g., 
ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER:  THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE 
LAW FIRM (1988). 
 16. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists:  
An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 313, 330–39 (1985). 
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scheme whereby associates’ income increases significantly upon promotion 
decreases their incentive to leave.  And the tournament competition for the 
ultimate prize, making partner, provides a strong disincentive to shirk.  At 
the same time, the tournament organization provides associates with two 
important reassurances.  Partners have an incentive to deliver on the 
promise of sharing their human capital and training associates well, because 
failure to do so deprives the firm of developing a strong pool of future 
partners.  Next, in return for their labor contribution to the firm, associates 
are compensated handsomely with both high pay and elevated professional 
status.17
Under the model, each partner mentors and supervises several associates 
pursuant to a partner-to-associate ratio that ensures profit maximizing and 
efficient utilization of partners’ social and cultural capital vis-à-vis 
associates’ labor.
   
18  Over time, as new partners are continuously elected 
and begin to mentor new generations of associates, the model yields two 
important consequences.  First, the tournament theory results in an 
associate-heavy, pyramid shaped organizational structure, in which 
associates outnumber partners pursuant to the firm’s partner-to-associate 
ratio.  Second, the model features an internal growth engine:  the 
tournament theory results in a continuous gradual expansion in the number 
of partners, and correspondingly, a continuous increase in the number of 
associates.  The end result is exponential growth within the firm—in sheer 
size, in number of offices, in profits, and in geographical reach.19
In turn, the emphasis on large corporate clients explains both the demand 
and supply sides of the model:  on the demand side, large corporate entities 
became the target of significant and complex bodies of regulation, and their 
own growth led to an increased demand for their legal services.
 
20
 
 17. Id. at 322–29; see also GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 
  On the 
supply side, provision of transactional and litigation legal services to large 
corporate clients in part explains the structure of large corporate law firms.  
Large corporate clients tend to be involved in significant transactions and 
complex litigations, and have routine standard needs such as quarterly 
filings, and corporate minutes that regularly create “paperwork” for the 
large law firm’s associate-heavy base.  Thus, the practice realities of large 
corporate law firms, catering primarily to large corporate clients, tend to 
comport with the prediction of the tournament of lawyers model by 
7; Wilkins & Gulati, supra 
note 7. 
 18. Studying means of legitimizing power and authority, Bourdieu has identified three 
forms of symbolic capital:  economic capital (money and property), social capital (social 
networks), and cultural capital (cultural competence). Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of 
Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241–
58 (John G. Richardson ed., 1986).  See Fiona M. Kay, The Social Significance of the 
World’s First Women Lawyers, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 397, 419–20 (2007) (book review), 
for a discussion of the expanding use of the Bourdieusian approach in studies of 
contemporary law practice. 
 19. See generally GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 7. 
 20. Id.; Wald, supra note 7. 
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following a pyramid structure and relying on a broad base of associates to 
support a profit-maximizing partner-to-associate ratio.21
One way to understand the internal growth engine of large law firms is as 
a mechanism of organic growth, that is, growth on the supply side that 
depends on and follows increased client demand for corporate legal 
services.  The internal growth engine aspect of the standard story, however, 
tends to obscure the model’s essential assumption regarding increased client 
demand, without which large law firm growth cannot continue to take 
place.  Indeed, the internal growth engine implicitly minimizes the role of 
clients in explaining law firms’ growth by making clients, and their demand 
for legal services, a necessary background assumption rather than an 
integral part of the story.  In the context of the tournament theory, the 
internal growth engine takes a life of its own, independent of client demand, 
suggesting that by virtue of organizing as tournaments of lawyers, large law 
firms must grow quickly.  In this sense, the growth aspect of the standard 
story constitutes an instance of lawyer exceptionalism:  it focuses so 
intently on lawyers and their organization that it negates the inherent 
importance of clients to law practice.
 
22
To be sure, the body of work that told the standard story was limited in 
scope—examining the organization, structure, and history of Wall Street’s 
elite law firms and their successor firms, as well as of a small subset of 
large firms, both on and off Wall Street, which adopted and followed the 
Cravath system.  Moreover, it accounted for the organization and growth of 
large law firms in a particular era:  one in which law firms faced robust 
demand for legal services from large corporate entities, and in which the 
relative small size of in-house legal departments precluded entity clients 
from both closely supervising and managing large law firms’ work, and 
from handling routine paperwork in-house.
  Yet a law firm growth model that 
implicitly assumes increased demand and otherwise mostly ignores clients 
is bound to prove not only lawyer-centric but also incapable of explaining 
and predicting growth patterns under conditions in which demand for 
corporate legal services was stagnant or in decline. 
23
In a historical context, conflating and confusing Wall Street’s elite with 
large law firms more generally was an understandable, even excusable 
mistake:  as late as the 1960s and 1970s, Wall Street elite law firms 
constituted and dominated the world of large law firms.  It was only in later 
years, when the universe of large law firms expanded to include firms from 
different places and of different molds, that a gap emerged between the 
Cravath System—which has come to be understood as the standard story of 
   
 
 21. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 7, at 77–120. 
 22. See John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers for Conservative Causes:  Clients, Ideology, and 
Social Distance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5, 33–34 (2003); Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer 
Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REV. 73, 76–77 (2010). 
 23. Cf. Eli Wald, In-House Myths, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 407, 413–17. 
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large law firms more generally—and the actual practice realities of large 
law firms.24
Second-generation literature relaxed some of the model’s basic 
assumptions, exploring phenomena such as a shift from one tournament 
(among associates competing for a partnership) to a series of tournaments 
(among non-equity partners competing for equity partnership); a transition 
from an “up-or-out” probation period to a more elastic, diamond-shaped 
structure including multiple non-associate, associate, and partnership tracks; 
the institutionalization and professionalization of law firms; the shifting 
culture and ideology of the firm; and intentional and implicitly 
discriminatory hiring and promotion patterns.
 
25  Nonetheless, the standard 
story of the large law firm with its constitutive features—emphasis on 
corporate and transactional work; organization as a tournament or 
tournaments of lawyers at least in terms of understanding the roles of 
associates and partners; reliance on an associate-heavy base, and, as new 
non-partnership elastic tracks were developed, reliance on a non-partner-
heavy base; and, most important, expecting and predicting growth focusing 
on the law firm’s internal growth engine—has continued to dominate the 
scholarship.26
In a provocative 2010 article titled The Death of Big Law, Larry Ribstein 
asserted that the firm structure and some limited growth constitute a 
mechanism of “reputational bonding” that enables partners to minimize 
agency costs between lawyers and clients.
 
27  Yet as his title suggests, 
Ribstein did not believe that reputational bonds can explain the growth of 
contemporary large law firms and he therefore predicted their eventual 
decline, of which, to date, there is little evidence.  Recently, Bernard Burk 
and David McGowan maintained that large law firms’ organization and 
growth are explained in part in terms of relational capital, that is, that the 
firm and its growth serve as internal referral networks for partners with 
excess human capital, as well as an arena in which they can mine their own 
capital with the help of worker bee attorneys.28  Yet even Burk and 
McGowan’s “brittle” model of relational capital concedes the key features 
of law firms that serve “substantial business organizations,” are organized 
in “essentially two classes of professionals” and feature internal growth.29
 
 24. Eli Wald, The Other Legal Profession and the Orthodox View of the Bar:  The Rise 
of Colorado’s Elite Law Firms, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 605 (2009). 
 
 25. See, e.g., Galanter & Henderson, supra note 7; Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes 
to Priorities:  Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041 
(2011); Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal 
Profession or Who Is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1079 (2011); Wald, supra note 7; David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So 
Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?  An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 
493 (1996). 
 26. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 7. But see Wald, supra note 24, at 609–20 
(challenging the dominance of the standard story of the legal profession and its large law 
firms). 
 27. Ribstein, supra note 6, at 753–54. 
 28. Burk & McGowan, supra note 5, at 64–70. 
 29. Id. at 8–10. 
2012] LARGE LAW FIRMS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2873 
As the dust began to settle over the Great Recession, however, a 
surprisingly rich reality has emerged, one that the standard story of the large 
law firm, even as revised, cannot explain.  Domestically and globally, as 
predicted by the standard story, some large national and global law firms 
certainly exist that feature corporate practices governed by tournaments of 
lawyers, are non-partner heavy and perhaps most striking, appear to grow 
organically either by promoting associates to the partnership or by mergers 
with and acquisitions of other law firms.30  Yet the marketplace also reveals 
what appear to be alternative models and growth patterns.  First, some 
“large” law firms have opted out and chose to remain, relatively speaking, 
small.  This, of course, is not a per se new development,31 but it is striking 
that many of the historically elite large law firms have taken this path,32 
defying the organic growth prediction of the standard story, as well as, 
increasingly, its expectation of a non-partner-heavy lawyer pool.  Second, 
some national large firms have pursued a limited regional growth model, as 
opposed to a global one,33
 
 30. As the market for corporate legal services has become increasingly global, the 
standard story has been deployed to explain the emergence and growth of global law firms.  
John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers:  The Role of Elite Law Firms in International Business 
Transactions, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 38–44 (2007); Christopher J. Whelan, The 
Paradox of Professionalism:  Global Law Practice Means Business, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. 
REV. 465, 466 (2008). But see Laurence Etherington & Robert Lee, Ethical Codes and 
Cultural Context:  Ensuring Legal Ethics in the Global Law Firm, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 95, 107 (2007) (questioning the applicability of the standard model to non-Anglo-
American global law firms). 
 which the standard story simply cannot explain.  
  Baker & McKenzie, for example, grew organically over the years to become one of 
the world’s largest global law firms. See Firm History, BAKER & MCKENZIE, 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/firmfacts/firmhistory/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); see also 
John Flood & Peter D. Lederer, Becoming a Cosmopolitan Lawyer, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2513 (2012).  Bryan Cave, another global giant, followed a similar growth pattern. See 
History, BRYAN CAVE, http://www.bryancave.com/bryancave/history/ (last visited Apr. 21, 
2012).  DLA Piper, in contrast, grew in recent years as a result of several mergers between 
American and British law firms. See Our History, DLA PIPER, http://www.dlapiper.com/
global/about/ourhistory/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 31. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz of New York, a leading elite law firm at the top of 
the Am Law 200 profit-per-partner chart, has long been known as an M&A boutique. See Eli 
Wald, The Rise of the Jewish Law Firm or Is the Jewish Law Firm Generic?, 76 UMKC L. 
REV. 885, 914 (2008). 
 32. These include firms such as Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Davis Polk & Wardwell; 
Shearman & Sterling; and Sullivan & Cromwell.  Striking but not surprising:  as I argue 
elsewhere, the very elitist conservatism that explained these firms’ status also inhibited their 
growth.  Similarly, it is perhaps not surprising that some of the new giants are the old Jewish 
firms of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and Weil, Gotshal & Manges. See Wald, 
supra note 7, at 1839–41; Wald, supra note 31, at 914–33. 
 33. See, e.g., Brian Baxter, Faegre & Benson, Baker & Daniels Say Their Merger Is 
Officially On, AM. LAW. (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/
PubArticleFriendlyTAL.jsp?id=1202518842532 (reporting on the merger between Faegre & 
Benson and Baker & Daniels to create a Minneapolis-Indianapolis regional giant). Compare 
Holland & Hart Opens Las Vegas Office, DENVER BUS. J., Sept. 25, 2006, available at 2006 
WLNR 16611216, with Holland & Hart Adds 29 Lawyers in Salt Lake City, DENVER BUS. J., 
May 17, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 9830393 (reporting the regional growth of the 
firm). See generally WILLIAM H. HORNBY, THE LAW OUT WEST:  HOLLAND & HART 1947–
1988 (1989) (describing the background conditions and considerations that informed the 
regional mode and growth strategy adopted by the firm). 
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Third, some have followed a smart growth strategy establishing niches in 
particular subject matters, contradicting the corporate law emphasis of the 
standard story.  Fourth, some large firms have disappeared, electing to 
merge with growing law firms.34
As studies of the large law firm have multiplied, critics have argued that 
scholars ought to pay closer attention to other, less “sexy,” often-neglected 
segments of the profession.
  These rich practice realities disprove the 
standard account and its constitutive features.  In particular, they establish 
that the internal growth engine simply does not explain the growth patterns 
of large law firms in a day and age in which increased client demand for 
corporate services cannot be taken for granted.  New models of organization 
and theories of growth patterns must be developed to account for the 
diversity of entities populating the large law firm universe. 
35  The critique is not without merit:  as 
important and interesting as large law firms are, the vast majority of 
American lawyers do not practice with large firms and are not directly 
influenced by large law firms’ practice realities.36
 
 34. See, e.g., Brian Baxter, Bryan Cave to Combine with Holme Roberts & Owen, 
AMLAW DAILY (Dec. 6, 2011, 9:01 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/
2011/12/bryan-cave-hro.html (reporting on the acquisition of Holme Roberts & Owen, a 
regional Am Law 200 law firm by Bryan Cave, a global Am Law 200 firm); Ribstein, supra 
note 
  Nonetheless, in a 
meaningful way, the relatively extensive literature on large law firms is too 
narrow and does not capture the actual richness of large law firm practice 
realities, domestically and globally.  Historically focused (if only implicitly) 
on the old Wall Street elite, the literature is now centered on the world of 
the emerging global law firms, neglecting in the process both the majority 
of large American law firms and their lawyers, and some super-national and 
international law firms that do not conform to the standard story.  To be 
sure, the study of global law firms is certainly worthwhile.  Yet it simply 
does not cover the entirety, or even the bulk, of the large law firm universe. 
6, at 813–15. 
 35. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND HIS COMMUNITY:  THE PRACTICING 
BAR IN A MIDDLE-SIZED CITY (1967); LANDON, supra note 15; AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM 
L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS:  POWER AND MEANING IN THE 
LEGAL PROCESS (1995); see also David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” 
to “Diversity Is Good for Business”:  The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and 
the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548 (2004). 
 36. CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT:  THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION 
IN 2000, at 7–9 (2004).  Recent empirical undertakings include the After the JD project, see 
RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH & EDUC. & AM. BAR 
FOUND., AFTER THE JD:  FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (2004), 
available at http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/ajd.pdf, and the 
GLEE project, exploring emerging legal professions in emerging economies, see 
Globalization, Lawyers, and Emerging Economies (GLEE), PROGRAM ON THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION, HARV. L. SCH.,  http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/plp/pages/glee.php (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012); see also Is the In-House Counsel Movement Going Global?  
Assessing the Role of Internal Counsel in Emerging Economies, UNIV. OF WIS. MADISON 
(Nov. 19, 2011), http://law.wisc.edu/media/item/2-1%20Session%20no.5-%20In-House%20
Counsel%20in%20Transnational%20Firms%20and%20Emerging%20Economies.mp4 
(video recording of discussion by David B. Wilkins at a Wisconsin Law Review 
Symposium). 
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Put differently, the challenge of studying large law firms, domestically 
and globally, is to be willing to question what we think we know about 
them.  Scholars of large law firms need to set aside the orthodoxy of the 
standard story.  Rather than assuming that a one-size-fits-all tale of 
corporate law firms—organized as tournaments of lawyers in a non-partner-
heavy fashion and featuring organic growth—tells the story of all large law 
firms, the evidence notwithstanding; or imposing theoretical models on 
existing firms, their limited explanatory power notwithstanding, researchers 
need to study the organization and structure of actual large law firms.   
To that end, this Article studies the rise of a large Am Law 200 firm that 
does not follow the standard story of the tournament theory and its internal 
growth engine prediction.37
 
 37. From March through December 2010, the author conducted thirty semi-structured 
interviews with current and former Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP partners, as well 
as partners at other leading Colorado-based large law firms.  Professor Wald contacted 
respondents by snowball sampling.  After interviewing the three founding members of the 
firm, as well as several of the lawyers who joined the firm in its early years, he asked each 
interviewee for a list of partners at the firm, former partners, or attorneys at other firms who 
would be the most knowledgeable about the experience of the firm and the environment in 
which it practiced.  Wald contacted the referrals and continued the process. 
  Instead, its story suggests an alternative model, 
one that relies on practice areas other than corporate law, depends on a 
client base not dominated by large corporate entities, and that features a 
partner-heavy, as opposed to an associate-heavy (or as of late, a non-
partner-heavy) attorney pool.  Most significantly, this case study questions 
the basic prediction of the standard story with regard to the growth of large 
law firms.  Rather than relying on an internal growth engine to get bigger 
by organically increasing the number of its partners and rapidly increasing 
the number of its associates, the firm initially utilized other models of 
organic growth and subsequently replaced organic growth with “smart” 
strategic growth models.  In our hypercompetitive era in which large law 
firms can no longer assume and expect continuously increasing demand for 
their legal services, and therefore cannot rely naïvely on their own internal 
growth engine, the case study offers a fresh perspective on how large law 
  Snowball sampling can introduce bias into a study in that the sample respondents 
may not be representative of the universe, but rather of a selected group or network within a 
universe.  These potential biases are always a concern.  In this case, the author believes that 
bias through snowball sampling is less of a concern.  The purpose of the present Article is 
not to generalize to a broad universe, but to explore the experience and growth of BHFS.  
The focus of the study was BHFS’s establishment, client base, growth, and development, as 
well as its culture and professional ethos.  Wald wanted to study the considerations that have 
shaped and influenced the firm’s structure, organization, growth, hiring and promotion 
procedures, compensation, and future plans.  The purposive universe was therefore limited to 
current and former “partners with power,” see NELSON, supra note 15, such as founding and 
name partners, managing partners, practice group heads, and rainmakers at the firm, who 
were likely to be privy to, and exercise influence over, the firm’s important decision making 
processes.  The interviews were taped and transcribed verbatim.  The respondents were told 
that their identities would be kept confidential.  The interviewees’ statements have been 
lightly edited by the Fordham Law Review for grammatical and stylistic clarity. 
  In the interest of full disclosure, Professor Wald currently serves as a legal ethics 
advisor to Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP. 
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firms can respond, adapt, and succeed in a national, even global, 
fragmented, and multi-dimensional competitive market for legal services. 
II.  THE STANDARD STORY TESTED:  THE CASE OF BHFS 
In 2005, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP (BHFS), a large Denver-
based law firm listed in the Am Law 200, had 109 lawyers and was the fifth 
largest law firm in Colorado.38  By 2009, the firm had 213 attorneys, gross 
revenue of $131,000,000, and an impressive profits-per-partner of 
$735,000.39
A straightforward application of the standard story would assume that 
BHFS was a corporate law firm, and purport to explain the firm’s growth in 
terms of its internal growth engine, given a profit-maximizing partner-to-
associate ratio.  Second-generation insights would predict eventual adoption 
of multiple associate and partnership tracks alongside continued organic 
growth, including increased lateral hires and mergers with other law firms. 
 
The practice realities at the firm, however, differ quite significantly from 
some of the assumptions and predictions made by the standard story.  To 
begin with, the firm was not primarily a corporate law firm and its clients 
were not primarily large corporate entities.  Instead, the firm was 
established as a general service walk-in practice, developed into a 
commercial real estate boutique, later adding a lobbying arm, and finally 
became a full-service large law firm.  Its initial non-corporate law expertise 
and client base in turn influenced the structure and growth pattern of the 
firm.  Whereas the standard story predicts that a firm’s tournament structure 
will result in an associate-heavy lawyer pool, BHFS never developed a 
great appetite for associate labor.  In particular, the firm’s commercial real 
estate work did not create a significant need for paperwork, and as a result 
the firm had little use for armies of associates.  Instead, the firm was and 
still is partner heavy with a relatively low partner-to-associate ratio.40  That 
low ratio deprived the firm of having an internal growth engine.  As a 
result, the firm grew gradually, steadily, and linearly, but certainly not 
exponentially.41
Next, as the firm grew in size and reputation and began to compete with 
non-Colorado large law firms for corporate and litigation work—if only 
initially for the corporate and litigation work of its real estate clients—its 
competitive edge was the promise of hands-on involvement of its partners, 
its lean staffing of assignments with fewer attorneys and, in particular, 
fewer associates, and its lower hourly rates.  This competitive edge was 
 
 
 38. Wald, supra note 24, at 683. 
 39. The Second Hundred, AM. LAW., June 1, 2010, at 111. 
 40. Interview #4, in Denver, Colo. (Apr. 14, 2010), at 14 (“We have always been partner 
heavy, we were partner heavy in the ’80s . . . [and] ’90s and probably still are.”). 
 41. On the loss of corporate work historically done by large law firms to in-house legal 
departments, see Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law 
Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277 (1985); Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal 
Challenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization:  The Role of the General Counsel, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1057 (1997); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional 
Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479 (1989).  
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reinforced by its partner-heavy workforce and its ethos of around-the-clock 
client service, in a day and age where Colorado’s largest firms still featured 
a more relaxed culture.42
Finally, BHFS did not get bigger by utilizing the internal growth engine 
predicted by the standard story.  The internal growth engine is an example 
of organic growth in that it follows client demand, if only passively and 
implicitly.
  As a result, while the firm was partner heavy and 
had fewer associates than the tournament of lawyers model would have 
predicted, it quickly developed a tiered partnership structure, and relied on a 
rainmaker and worker bee model.  In other words, unlike the standard 
story’s account, BHFS’s adoption of tiers of partners was not a recent 
phenomenon designed in the shadow of the Great Recession to allow it to 
retain and please rainmakers in an increasingly competitive and mobile 
environment.  Rather, it was a structural feature that reflected its different 
organization, client base, and the nature of legal services provided to 
clients. 
43
A.  Getting Bigger Without Relying on an Internal Growth Engine:   
Client-Driven Organic Growth 
  Yet an internal growth engine is certainly not the only means 
of organic growth based on client needs.  Rather than growing passively by 
increasing the number of its associates and upon promotion of its partners 
pursuant to the probation period and partner-to-associate ratio of the 
tournament theory, BHFS grew organically by proactively and laterally 
adding partners and hiring associates as prescribed by its clients’ needs.  
Importantly, BHFS’s growth model, initially organic, quickly turned 
strategic and “smart.”  Rather than feature passive reliance on increased 
client demand and the firm’s internal growth engine, BHFS turned to 
aggressive lateral hiring early on (and later on to strategic mergers); it 
sought to grow and establish itself in traditional and non-traditional practice 
areas low in paperwork and high in prestige, with high-end work and 
cutting-edge expertise.  As a result, its growth patterns did not feature 
explosive growth of its home office, followed by expansion either to other 
major metropolitan markets in the U.S. or global venues, as anticipated by 
the standard story.  Rather, it expanded as a function of its smart growth 
model regionally and in select markets. 
1.  Transition from a Walk-In General Practice to a Real Estate Boutique 
The law firm of Brownstein Hyatt & Farber was formed in 1968 by 
childhood friends and law school buddies Norm Brownstein, Jack Hyatt, 
and Steve Farber.  The trio grew up in West Denver, then a predominantly 
Jewish, blue-collar neighborhood.44
 
 42. See Wald, supra note 
  Brownstein Hyatt & Farber had a 
24, at 620–79. 
 43. Supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 44. See generally JEANNE E. ABRAMS, HISTORIC JEWISH DENVER (1982) (describing 
historical Jewish neighborhoods, temples, hospitals, businesses, and other notable sites); 
JEANNE E. ABRAMS, JEWISH DENVER:  1859–1940 (2007); ALLEN DUPONT BRECK, THE 
CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE JEWS OF COLORADO 1859–1959 (1960); 1 PHIL GOODSTEIN, 
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modest start.  Norm’s father, a small business owner, co-signed the lease, 
and the three rented a small office space at the 350 Capital Life Building, 
with Norm’s mother serving as the firm’s first receptionist.  Having no prior 
contacts, networks, or prospective clients, the young firm started as a walk-
in general law practice, handling cases that ranged from divorce work to 
litigation, and from criminal matters to bankruptcy.  It relied on casual 
referrals, for example, from a mentor assigned by the bar association, an 
established solo litigator with an office next door who had an overflow of 
clients, and from the legal aid society.  A friend of Norm’s brother had a 
collection agency, and after becoming unhappy with his law firm, he began 
sending the firm significant collection work, which over time led to 
additional collection work from other entities. 
One founding partner described the firm’s early client base: 
[W]e opened our door and we had a few clients, we sent out 
announcements, and called people we knew.  I remember one of our first 
matters was a house closing for a friend of ours. . . .  [S]omebody had 
referred some real estate business . . .  [I]f we had an expertise it was 
doing anything that walked into the door . . . .45
Another partner who had a part-time criminal defense practice recalled:  
“[S]ome of my clients would come into the waiting room and if Norm 
would see them he would just shiver all over, but when they brought in 
grocery bags full of cash to pay their bill, it was okay with Norm.”
 
46
Gradually, the young firm began to develop a reputation for real estate 
work.  The specialization was at first random and then grew organically:  
following a referral of some real estate business work, a contemporary 
whose father was a wealthy real estate developer gave the firm additional 
real estate work.  Another friend who was starting a real estate and 
construction company hired the firm.  Then, based on the firm’s emerging 
reputation in the field, a wealthy Jewish businessman, oil man, and banker 
gave the firm some real estate work.  Slowly but surely, the firm developed 
a reputation as a real estate boutique, representing developers, land 
speculators, and residential and condominium developers. 
 
The firm’s expansion, however, was not merely a matter of coincidence, 
followed by hard work, organic growth, and increased specialization in real 
estate work.  Rather, the firm began to occupy a niche that had been 
previously unfulfilled by the established Denver bar.  One partner noted:  “I 
could see that the big firms who we [meant] nothing to basically were not 
interested in real estate; they were interested in business.  So it was kind of 
open . . . .”47  Another partner observed that “the large firms had real estate 
groups, but they may not have been as focused on real estate . . . they 
weren’t directly seeking real estate work, as such . . . .”48
 
DENVER IN OUR TIME:  A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE MODERN MILE HIGH CITY:  BIG MONEY 
IN THE BIG CITY 7–37 (1999). 
 
 45. Interview #12, in Denver, Colo. (May 25, 2010), at 2–3. 
 46. Interview #2, in Denver, Colo. (Mar. 31, 2010), at 6. 
 47. Interview #13, in Denver, Colo. (June 1, 2010), at 1. 
 48. Interview #3, in Denver, Colo. (Apr. 14, 2010), at 16. 
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The existing large law firms steered clear of representing developers 
because of their own structure and organization, which demanded 
representation of large institutional clients who tolerated generous staffing 
and generated work for associates; as well as the perception of the work for 
developers as high risk and low in status.  Explained one partner, 
if a client went to a large firm to have a real estate deal done, it might 
have one of its corporate associates or real estate associates working on it 
and then the standard large firm thing [would happen,] where a young 
associate drafts a contract, a senior associate reviews it, a partner does the 
final review and [the] final goes to the client and that takes a few days.  If 
the client came here, they had a contract the next day if they needed it the 
next day, and somebody at the level of Norm, Jack, or Steve was involved 
in it.49
In other words, the traditional tournament structure of the established 
Denver bar produced relative delay and resulted in higher fees, which on 
the one hand did not fit the needs of developer clients, and, on the other 
hand, explained why the established law firms preferred to represent larger 
institutional clients, such as lenders. 
 
Another partner added, 
[R]eal estate is kind of boom bust and the larger firms don’t tolerate that 
kind of bust scenario . . . and frankly the larger firms didn’t have great 
real estate practices . . . .  [W]e had a culture here that was very, very 
responsive . . . [w]hereas the larger firms tend to be quite a bit more 
bureaucratic so that they’re just not as responsive and not as seasoned.  If 
you go to New York for a transaction, you’ll find that there’s a partner 
that really knows what he’s doing, and frankly may have just fabulous 
skills and expertise, but you’re also dealing with a third-year associate 
that really doesn’t and that person has spent a lot of time working on due 
diligence, understands part of the deal, understands part of the law, maybe 
has closed a couple of deals, but not very many.  Being a smaller firm we 
were able to compete and the developers were attracted to us because we 
had great transactional expertise, and we were responsive, and the larger 
firms just simply weren’t that way.  We ran into the same thing in the 
banking area.50
The needs of established corporate law firms who followed the 
traditional Cravath System model of heavily staffing matters with associates 
and generating higher fees, as well as those firms’ disdain for low-status 
areas such as real estate, created pockets of practice relatively shielded from 
competition in which smaller firms such as BHFS could grow and establish 
themselves.
 
51
 
 49. Id. at 17. 
  In turn, the very nature of BHFS’s provision of legal services 
and its clients’ expectations helped determine its organization as a 
partner-heavy firm. 
 50. Interview #4, supra note 40, at 8–9. 
 51. On protected pockets of practice, see Wald, supra note 7, at 1833–36; Wald, supra 
note 31, at 914–18. 
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Over time, the firm established a leading reputation as a commercial real 
estate boutique and began to grow steadily.  With Norm increasingly 
pursuing real estate work, Steve undertaking real estate and corporate work, 
and Jack assuming responsibility as the firm’s manager and doing tax 
work—and given that the three disliked litigation—the firm needed a 
litigator to be able to address some of the interests of the firm’s real estate 
clients, for example, in construction litigation.  In October of 1972, the firm 
added two new partners:  Ken Robins to its growing real estate practice; and 
Mark Leonard, its first litigator, a former classmate of the three founders.  
The firm’s sixth lawyer and fourth name partner was John Madden, another 
contemporary from law school, who had established himself as a prominent 
litigator.   
As dictated by the ebbs and flows of work and the growing needs of 
clients, the firm grew in modest spurts, from three lawyers to five to six, 
then ten to twelve, then twenty.  The firm’s growth pattern was organic:  
mostly in its booming real estate practice, and as needed, in ancillary areas 
serving the needs of its real estate clients, such as litigation.  Importantly, 
however, most of this early growth was accomplished by means of lateral 
recruitment of experienced partners, not by hiring associates.  
Correspondingly, the firm first added a conference room and a fourth office 
to its original location at 350 Capital Life Center, then by 1980, moved to a 
larger space at 1660 Lincoln and, in 1990, moved to its current location 
occupying several floors in a downtown location. 
By the early 1980s, the firm was a well-known real estate boutique in 
Colorado, representing developers and investors.  One partner noted that “if 
Colorado’s established large firms “had a bank, then they knew they had a 
steady stream of work . . . [W]e never had the substantial amount of our 
work being on the lending side, it was always more from the development 
side and the investment side.”52
most of the deals that I worked on in the ’80s had somebody from Holme 
Roberts
  The partner added that 
53 on the other side, usually representing the bank . . . .  [I]t may 
have been a difference in that their approach to real estate was from the 
lender’s side, which is very cautious, very analytical, . . . and not taking a 
view of the upside of a real estate transaction because the lender doesn’t 
get the upside.  The lender always has to look at the downside and is 
going to get stuck with it.  Whereas the developer wants to know “how 
fast can I get this under contract, can I get out of the contract if I need to,” 
the larger firms had a more process-driven way of handling deals, and it 
might have been because they were usually representing lenders, and it 
was hard for them to make that transition to the mentality of a 
developer . . . let alone a speculator.54
 
 52. Interview #3, supra note 
 
48, at 17–18. 
 53. Holme Roberts & Owen was, for over a century, one of Colorado’s elite law firms. 
See Wald, supra note 24, at 651.  In late 2011, the firm was acquired by Bryan Cave. See 
Baxter, supra note 34. 
 54. Interview #3, supra note 48, at 17. 
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The firm established a position of dominance in the representation of 
land developers and investors.  Recalled one partner, 
[W]e were going through a period of time where it seemed like whenever 
there was a major project, we were the firm that was brought into it, and it 
was a lot of fun to represent those types of projects, it was a great 
experience.  It was like having a thousand and a ten thousand piece puzzle 
and putting it together and that was kind of the challenge of [the] practice 
of law . . . .55
Another noted that 
 
[t]he Skyline started to develop and we probably had a piece of every deal 
that was done in [the] Skyline, from representing the developer, to 
representing the landowner, to representing . . . the contractor, to 
representing . . . you name any aspect, we probably had a part in every 
building that was built from 1975 on.56
The growth in the firm’s reputation and practice allowed it not only to 
develop a small ancillary litigation department serving the occasional 
litigation needs of its real estate clients, but also to organically grow a small 
corporate department, specializing in cutting-edge financing of commercial 
real estate transactions.  The firm’s brand of organic growth, however, 
differed from the standard story’s internal growth engine.  Rather than 
emphasizing lawyers and their numbers, BHFS’s organic growth was 
driven by clients and their needs. 
 
[D]uring the downturn in the late ’80s and early ’90s, the way to get retail 
development done was through public–private partnerships, through 
Urban Renewal Projects, or some arrangement with the local 
government . . . .  So if a developer came along that [the cities] believed 
could actually generate sales tax, then they were very interested in 
whatever they could do to help those projects. . . .  So these were . . . great 
opportunities for me because I learned all about Urban Renewal, a lot 
about municipal law, a lot about bond financing . . . .57
That partner also recalled, “[W]e developed a lot of work later in the ’80s 
with savings and loans companies doing their major loans . . . and this was 
through connections with people in the junk bond industry.”
 
58  A third 
partner noted, “[We] were working on the legislation that formed . . . the 
RTC [Resolution Trust Corporation] and that was going to affect these 
savings and loans clients . . . .”59
 
 55. Interview #12, supra note 
 
45, at 4.  “[T]he real estate market in Denver was . . . it 
was really the go-go years in the early ’80s; every piece of property downtown seemed like it 
passed through our office . . . .” Interview #3, supra note 48, at 4. 
 56. Interview #13, supra note 47, at 2. 
 57. Interview #3, supra note 48, at 12. 
 58. Id. at 9–10. 
 59. Id. at 11.  Similarly, Interviewee #4 described in detail how financing of real estate 
transactions evolved:  from variable rates to secondary mortgage market transactions and 
pooling of mortgages, low-income housing bonds, public finance, asset securitization, 
mortgage warehousing, real estate syndication, real estate investment trusts, private equity. 
Interview #4, supra note 40, at 2–5. 
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By the first decade of the twenty-first century, the firm had a real estate 
department of over sixty attorneys, and was a leading real estate presence 
locally and regionally.  Moreover, as the end result of its organic growth, it 
was no longer primarily representing local developers. 
[O]ur practice is at a level of sophistication and pricing that is much 
harder for your local entrepreneurial developer. . . .  [W]e got ourselves 
situated whether we wanted to or not, to be able to handle these very large 
portfolio transactions whether it was a refinancing or an acquisition, that’s 
how real estate was getting done from about 2002 to 2008, it was mega 
transactions. . . .  [S]o we need to maintain, we want to maintain our 
relationships with local developers, but they’re not going to own it, and 
they’re probably not going to control the project . . . .60
2.  Expansion from a Real Estate Boutique to Lobbying, 
Government Relations, and Power Brokering 
 
BHFS features one of the nation’s most influential and profitable 
lobbying practices, and its leaders are considered powerful political actors 
both locally and nationally.  A typical 1998 article listing the most powerful 
people in Denver, Colorado, listed Steve Farber at number one, followed by 
Denver’s Mayor, Colorado’s Governor, and Norm Brownstein at number 
four.61  In another article Norm Brownstein was called the “101st 
Senator.”62  At the firm level, BHFS was ranked ninth on the Influence 50 
Top Law Firms list in 2009,63 and was the fifth-largest lobbying firm in 
Washington, D.C. in 2009.64
Yet the firm’s early venture into lobbying and politics was a modest one, 
following the familiar path of happenstance, hard work, and diligent pursuit 
of opportunity that explained its growth as a real estate firm.  Norm and 
Steve had an interest in local and national politics that initially had little to 
do with their law practice.  Some of the early interest was quite literally 
coincidental and personal, as opposed to strategic and professional.  One 
partner at the firm recalled that “Norm got a very big interest in Tim 
[Wirth],
  
65
 
 60. Interview #3, supra note 
 he went to some meetings and he came back to us and he said, 
48, at 22–24. 
 61. Daniel Brogan, The Players, 5280:  DENVER MAG., Apr.–May 1998, at 42, 44. 
 62. Patrick Doyle, Maximillian Potter & Luc Hatlestad, The 5280 Fifty, 5280:  DENVER 
MAG., Jan. 2010, available at http://www.5280.com/magazine/2010/01/5280-fifty 
(“Brownstein’s ability to galvanize funding for virtually anything, from DIA to Stapleton, is 
so legendary on Capitol Hill that Ted Kennedy once called him ‘the 101st senator.’”). 
 63. To qualify for the Influence 50, law firms must have reported at least $2 million in 
Lobbying Disclosure Act fees and had at least $7 million in overall lobbying revenue. See 
The Influence 50, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 5, 2010, at 23. 
 64. Aldo Svaldi, Denver Law Firm Brownstein Hyatt Surges to Fifth in Lobbying 
Revenues, DENVER POST, June 13, 2010, at 1K, available at http://www.denverpost.com/
search/ci_15282169. 
 65. Timothy Endicott Wirth is a former U.S. Senator from Colorado.  Wirth, a 
Democrat, was a member of the House from 1975 to 1987 and was elected to the Senate in 
1986, serving one term there before stepping down. See Wirth, Timothy E., BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=
W000647 (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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‘oh, this Tim [Wirth] is the greatest and I want to get involved’ and fine, we 
encouraged that.”66
maybe only five or six [attorneys] in the firm, . . . my friend Hal [Haddon] 
agreed to be Gary Hart’s campaign manager,
  Another partner recalled that when there were 
67 and Hal called me and 
said, “Do you suppose you can get me a meeting with your firm to see if I 
could get them on board to support Gary Hart,” and I said, “I’ll 
try.” . . .  [S]o Norm and Steve were there, I was there, I don’t remember 
if Jack was there or not, but I believe he was—he would have been too 
afraid that we were going to give away money not to be there—but so 
Gary Hart comes over and this is his first senatorial campaign [in 
1974], . . . and I remember Norm saying, “What the hell can you do for 
us?”68
Other early political connections were personal in nature and stemmed 
from some lawyers’ interest in, and commitment to, the state of Israel. 
 
[W]e got involved in politics—and it was really not part of our practice—
with Hank Brown [pledge brother of Steve and Norm in college] running 
for Congress, state house and then Congress, and the U.S. Senate, and 
also on the Democratic side Tim [Wirth] running for Congress, and then 
U.S. Senate, and we met a lot of the people that they knew in 
Washington—from Al Gore to John Kerry—and it so happens we just 
talked to these people primarily over the issues of the U.S.–Israel 
relationship, and I don’t even remember lobbying any of the people I just 
mentioned on behalf of clients.69
Over time, the firm and its lawyers built on these relationships and have 
become influential in local and national politics.  One partner recalled, 
 
[Roy] Romer was running for governor and had asked me to chair his 
campaign, and so I became his campaign chair for three terms . . . .  [W]e 
had also helped Federico Peña in his run for mayor . . . .  [W]e weren’t 
doing it for business, necessarily, we were doing it because of how 
important we thought good leadership was to Denver evolving into a 
world class city in Colorado, evolving into the [place] where our children 
and our grandchildren would want to live,70
 
 66. Interview #10, in Denver, Colo. (May 12, 2010), at 4–5. 
 
 67. Harold A. Haddon, HADDON MORGAN FOREMAN, http://www.hmflaw.com/attorney-
harold-haddon.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  Gary Hart, a politician and lawyer, served 
as a U.S. Senator from Colorado between 1975 and 1987.  He ran in the presidential 
primaries in 1988, and was considered a frontrunner for the Democratic nomination until 
reports of an extramarital affair derailed his candidacy. See Hart, Gary Warren, 
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/
biodisplay.pl?index=H000287 (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); see also GARY HART, THE 
THUNDER AND THE SUNSHINE:  FOUR SEASONS IN A BURNISHED LIFE 97–161 (2010). 
 68. Interview #2, supra note 46, at 29. 
 69. Interview #12, supra note 45, at 3.  George Hanks “Hank” Brown, a politician and 
lawyer, served as a Republican U.S. Senator from Colorado between 1991 and 1997. See 
Brown, George Hanks (Hank), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.
congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000919 (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  Brown 
joined the law firm of BHFS as a partner in 2008. 
 70. Interview #12, supra note 45, at 4.  Roy R. Romer, a politician and lawyer, was the 
thirty-ninth Governor of Colorado. Biography of Governor Roy Romer, COLO. ST. ARCHIVES 
(June 18, 2003), http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/archives/romer/govbio.htm.  Federico 
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adding, 
The community was very good to us, and early on we always thought that 
it was necessary to become part of the community, again not necessarily 
[because] it was going to enhance our practice, but it was going to 
enhance us as people and it was going to make us feel a part of the 
community, and secondarily and indirectly make us unbelievable 
contacts . . . .71
Over time, however, the firm’s lawyers realized that political connections 
and relationships might allow them to more effectively serve their clients’ 
interests within the bounds of the law.  One partner described the 
connection between political relationships, lobbying, and traditional law 
practice: 
 
[T]here were times where if we couldn’t get the intended result for a 
client through negotiations, contract work, maybe through litigation, that 
there might also be a legislative solution, and from what I saw, we were 
probably one of the few firms that did that, and offered that to our clients, 
and I think that it set us [apart,] hopefully in a positive way [such] that we 
could reach solutions for our clients in ways that other law firms 
didn’t . . . .72
Another partner vividly described the inherent ties between a real estate 
practice on behalf of developers and a government relations practice: 
 
[A]s a land speculator, [a client] bought up a lot of land on what was to be 
[highway] C470 and the Governor, then Dick Lamb, killed the highway 
project.  I think that made the client and Norm Brownstein acutely aware 
that . . . when you’re doing business deals, and particularly real estate 
business deals, you can’t ignore the political side of what’s going on.  
Obviously we knew that in the zoning context, because there was plenty 
of politics there, but to have a huge project like a beltway basically killed 
for probably 10 years . . . by an executive decision of the Governor kind 
of brought home that you had to be more aware of other political forces.  I 
think that’s when the firm started to pay more attention to state politics 
and national politics too, because these large projects require federal 
funds, and there [are] a lot of national figures that get involved in any 
kind of business that you’re representing.73
Lobbying, as practiced by the firm, created synergies to all parties 
involved, private and public, allowing the firm to generate value not only 
for its clients but also for the community.
 
74
[A] lot of what I did personally was [to bring] the political leadership and 
the business leadership together to work on public opinion, and ultimately 
  Explained one partner: 
 
Fabian Peña, a politician and lawyer, was elected Mayor of Denver in 1983.  Peña 
subsequently served as U.S. Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of Energy. See 
Matthew L. Wald, Same Predicament, Different Agency:  Federico Fabian Pena, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1996, at A11.   
 71. Interview #12, supra note 45, at 6. 
 72. Id. at 5. 
 73. Interview #3, supra note 48, at 6. 
 74. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:  Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). 
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see to the execution of these projects.  None of them would have 
happened but for [our ability to create] a win–win atmosphere where 
government walked away and said “this is great for government,” and the 
business community walked away and said, “It’s great for the business 
community.”75
Gradually, the firm began to leverage these relationships nationally.  The 
same partner recalled, 
 
We did have one client walk in at one time [with] an issue in Washington, 
D.C., we looked at each other and thought . . . we might as well attempt to 
see if we could help, and we were very successful, and we decided that 
we would start lobbying on behalf of a few clients in Denver . . . .76
Of course, as documented by generations of Realist and subsequently 
Critical scholars, law and politics have always been closely, intimately, and 
inherently linked.
 
77  Large Wall Street law firms rose representing 
“captains of industry,”78 while benefiting from close social and cultural ties 
to the dominant power elites in the economy and political lives.79  In 
Colorado, a web of nepotism and political connections linked elite law 
firms to the political establishment, and explained the rise of some large law 
firms to the top of the Colorado legal profession.80  The phenomenon, to be 
sure, was a common one.81
What was unique about BHFS’s emerging lobbying practice, therefore, 
was not its reliance and utilization of the relationship between law and 
politics.  Rather, it was the overt manner in which it practiced law and 
politics, contradicting and shuttering the myth of the strict separation 
between law and politics.  Lawyers had always taken great care to pretend 
   
 
 75. Interview #12, supra note 45, at 5.  Similarly, one interviewee recalled receiving a 
phone call from the 
Governor’s office [in which he was told,] “We’re going to invite in all the [venture 
capitalists] and we’re going to invite in all the wealthy people, we’re going to get 
50 key business people, and we’re going to have two lawyers there, [and] we’d 
like you to be one of them because we want to see [what] we as government can 
do to help wealthy business.” 
Id. at 13. 
 76. Id. at 3–4. 
 77. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). 
 78. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 7, at 16 (quoting THERON GEORGE STRONG, 
LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER’S LIFETIME 378 (1914)). 
 79. E. DIGBY BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT:  ARISTOCRACY & CASTE IN 
AMERICA (1964); RICHARD BROOKHISER, THE WAY OF THE WASP:  HOW IT MADE AMERICA 
AND HOW IT CAN SAVE IT, SO TO SPEAK (1991); Wald, supra note 7, at 1810–25.  The very 
definition of elite large law firm lawyers embedded a role for lawyers that included a 
significant public role.  Indeed, a large body of literature laments the very decline of the role 
of lawyers as public citizens and civic leaders. E.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER 
LAWYERS:  HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 
(1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:  FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (1993); Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic 
Culture:  Confronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 1, 25–39 (2011). 
 80. See generally Wald, supra note 24. 
 81. See Wald, supra note 7. See generally BALTZELL, supra note 79; BROOKHISER, supra 
note 79. 
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they were not intimately linked.  Thus, lawyers taking public office at least 
formally severed their ties to their law firms, and prominent practicing 
lawyers engaged in political power brokering behind the scenes and outside 
of their law offices, often in country clubs.82  As described by another 
partner at the firm, “[P]olitics was always going on with law firms in 
Denver, but it was at the Denver Country Club or Cherry Hills Country 
Club or behind closed doors at [Holland &] Hart or [Davis Graham], etc. 
and what [we] did differently was to bring it out in the open.”83
The firm’s emerging reputation and subsequent growth began to attract 
the attention of Colorado’s established elite firms.  Recalled one partner, 
 
[T]hey kept telling all of the[ir] clients that we were just [a] political firm, 
and that was the pitch that other law firms were telling our 
people. . .  [W]e [had] played a role in politics in Colorado since the early 
1980s—both state and local not to say national—but [other firms] were 
just saying, “These guys are political guys; if you need something 
political that’s when you should go to them.”  That offended Farber and 
[me] because we were a lot more than political, but we just went on; we 
didn’t give it a second thought.  By the 1990s they . . . were still saying 
this, but we were getting more than our share of business in Colorado and 
supplementing it with national business that nobody had, and therefore we 
didn’t have any of the downside that happened over those 30 years.84
Another partner explained the role lobbying and government relations 
practice play vis-à-vis traditional law practice: 
 
[T]here’s a little bit of a misconception about lobbying, the type of 
lobbying we do.  It’s principally [for] corporations [that] want a particular 
thing changed in the Bankruptcy Code or a particular piece of proposed 
tax legislation that they want to get modified . . . it’s not a Democratic 
ACLU Planned Parenthood position versus a Focus on the Family 
position.  [I]t’s a business issue . . .  [P]eople’s historical political 
affiliation by which you sometimes gauge their level of social liberalism 
and conservatism, that aspect of that doesn’t even come into play when 
you’re representing the client, . . . when it comes down to just doing the 
business for the bulk of the clients, it’s not hard.  We don’t do lobbying 
for social interest groups by [and] large so it isn’t as big of an issue as the 
people outside of the firm might think it would be.85
He added that 
 
lots of people in the business world love to hear what they think is inside 
gossip in Washington.  So it is great to take Norm or Steve with you on a 
pitch to a client, and suddenly they get a phone call and it’s Senator so-
and-so’s office wanting to talk . . . .86
 
 82. Wald, supra note 
 
24, at 642–53; Wald, supra note 7, at 1831. 
 83. Interview #2, supra note 46, at 29.  Holland & Hart and Davis, Graham & Stubbs are 
two of Colorado’s well-established elite law firms. See Wald, supra note 24, at 646–48, 669–
71, 682–83. 
 84. Interview #13, supra note 47, at 4–5. 
 85. Interview #20, in Denver, Colo. (June 16, 2010), at 29–30. 
 86. Id. at 34. 
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3.  Informal Formation of Practice Groups 
As the firm grew and transformed, first from a walk-in general law 
practice to a real estate boutique representing developers and investors, then 
adding a government relations practice, it began to capitalize and build on 
the expanding needs of its real estate clients to establish additional practice 
groups such as litigation and corporate law. 
Recalled one partner, “[W]hen I came in, I was the litigation 
department . . . [handling] anything that came in with regard to 
litigation . . . .  I did just about everything that walked in the door.”87
[I]f you’re not in the business of criminal law and if you start to get out of 
it, it’s hard to stay in it.  So that business dwindled over the years, and I 
became much more of a civil litigator, but I did everything that came in.  I 
did securities litigation, construction litigation, divorces, workouts.
  That 
attorney had a background in criminal law.  Describing the gradual process 
by which his practice moved away from criminal defense and grew to serve 
the needs of the firm’s real estate clients, the partner noted: 
88
The same attorney further described his first case litigating on behalf of a 
real estate client: 
 
I remember one night, 2:00 in the morning, the phone rings [and] its 
[another partner at the firm], he’s completely freaked out, and he said 
“I’ve got this big construction case, . . . [the] trial [is] coming up and I 
can’t do it, I’m overwhelmed . . . can you help me” and I said “sure.”  So 
the next morning, I wasn’t helping him[, rather,] he gave me the case and 
that was my first big construction case.89
This major construction litigation led to additional cases representing the 
firm’s real estate clients, but, the litigator noted, “[E]ventually I got help 
because the litigation got out of hand, [and I] couldn’t do it all.”
 
90  Adding 
to its litigation practice, the firm hired its sixth lawyer, John Madden, a 
litigator from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, because the firm was “getting 
more and more good-sized litigation, [including] a lot of construction 
litigation.”91
Organic growth thus led to the gradual and informal development of an 
ancillary litigation department, fueled in part by the firm’s founding 
lawyers’ relative lack of interest in litigation.  The firm laterally hired a 
seasoned litigator, and then another, and the litigation department was thus 
established. 
 
The departmentalization of the firm was gradual and informal, 
organically driven by the growing needs of clients and the desire of the firm 
to service the non-real estate needs of its real estate clients, rather than refer 
the work to competing firms.  Explained one partner, 
 
 87. Interview #2, supra note 46, at 6. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 6–7. 
 90. Id. at 7–8. 
 91. Id. at 7. 
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[Y]ou tried to find other counsel with those specialties who were in firms 
that didn’t really compete with us, they were strictly water firms or 
whatever, and could really provide good advice to the client.  So I think 
being able to do all of those things in-house is particularly helpful.92
That partner revealingly described some of the consequences of organic 
departmentalization, noting: 
 
[I]t brought home to me the difference between working in real estate in 
our firm and in a big firm, because when I worked on real estate deals 
those first three years, if the client was forming a partnership, I did the 
partnership agreement, if they were forming a corporation, I did all the 
corporate documents.  You did everything that was ancillary to the 
transaction.  When [a lateral hire] came in from [an established Denver 
firm] she was very well trained on real estate documents and the finance 
side, but she’d never done a partnership, a joint venture agreement, 
corporate documents, any of that, and she said, “Well the corporate 
people did those.”  So that kind of made me realize that not being 
departmentalized gave me a broader experience than you had in a large 
firm . . . .93
B.  Getting Bigger While Remaining Leaner:  
A Client-Driven, Partner-Heavy Model 
 
The standard story of the large law firm is lawyer-centric in the sense that 
it purports to account for law firm growth by reference to the firm’s 
organization as a tournament of lawyers, which in turn explains its 
associate-heavy structure as well as its exponential growth.  BHFS’s early 
growth suggests a different story, shifting the emphasis from the supply 
side of lawyers to the demand side of clients.  The firm’s tale implies a 
client-centered growth model whereby the firm’s growth is a function of 
organic service of client needs and, in the case of BHFS, a partner-heavy 
structure accompanied by lean staffing. 
1.  A Partner-Heavy Model 
Contrary to the tournament theory prediction, BHFS has always been 
partner heavy and did not resort to recruiting and training cohorts of 
associates based on a partner-to-associate ratio.  In contrast, the firm first 
grew by adding partners, not associates, and subsequently by recruiting 
partners laterally and hiring only a relatively small number of associates, 
many of whom were then made partners.  One partner explained: 
I think a lot of our reputation in real estate was built on the fact that the 
most experienced people were working on the deals, [the deals] weren’t 
delegated to somebody who didn’t have experience, and things got done 
on time . . . .  [W]e had a reputation for doing things in a timely 
fashion . . . and for not layering three or four lawyers reviewing 
 
 92. Interview #3, supra note 48, at 27. 
 93. Id. at 18–19. 
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everything.  The client knew who was doing their work and was dealing 
directly with the people who were doing their work . . . .94
The firm thus followed a partner-heavy model, staffing deals leanly, with 
its top partners assuming primary responsibility for many of the 
transactions and working with only a handful, or often only one additional 
junior person, and sometimes a partner rather than an associate. 
 
Recent literature on large law firms emphasizes client displeasure with 
the so-called standard staffing patterns of large firms.  Clients reportedly 
refuse to pay for first-year associates, both because they resent being billed 
for what they perceive to be the training costs of junior associates, and 
because their needs demand the attention and actual work of senior firm 
partners.95  The scholarship suggests that such developments strain the 
ability of large law firms to train and mentor junior associates, and 
questions the ability of large law firms to adapt to these supposed new 
realities.96
The experience of BHFS, however, questions the insights of the 
literature.  Contrary to the assumptions of the standard story, some law 
firms, BHFS included, have always utilized a partner-heavy model, 
ensuring the actual participation of their most senior partners in the 
transactions handled by the firm.  Moreover, the experience of the firm 
suggests that large law firms can grow by hiring significantly fewer 
associates, retaining and promoting a higher percentage of them, and 
training them effectively even under leaner staffing constraints.  It further 
implies that a partner-heavy model may not be a temporary adjustment 
made by large law firms after the Great Recession, in acknowledgment of 
the increased power of entity clients and their in-house legal departments.  
Rather, partner-heavy lean staffing may be a viable long-term model of 
competing for and retaining clients’ business. 
 
2.  “Hands-on Partners” Model  
A second theme developed by the literature is the increasingly more 
competitive, even hyper-competitive ideology and culture of large law 
firms.  To be sure, large law firm lawyers have always worked very hard.97
 
 94. Id. at 14–15. 
  
 95. David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals?  Toward a New Model of the Corporate 
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2108 & n.168 (2010). 
 96. Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale:  An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, 
Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 
246–47 (2000); Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 7, at 1644–57, 1665–73. 
 97. For example, a “24/7” workweek has been common among elite firms for a while.  
With regard to the Cravath firm, Swaine recalled that 
much of Cravath’s work with the associates was at night . . . .  Many nights young 
lawyers from the office sat [at his home] awaiting his return, spent an hour or two 
past midnight going over papers or discussing a question of law with him, and then 
returned to the office with instructions to be back at eight o’clock in the morning 
with a new draft or the answer. 
2 SWAINE, supra note 11, at 124.  Partners worked equally hard. 
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Yet historically, senior partners could reasonably expect, over time, to 
enjoy greater leisure time and flexibility, reaping the benefits of their 
elevated status within the firm.98  The traditional story thus suggests that 
adjusting to a hyper-competitive model might be a challenge to many large 
law firm lawyers.99
Once again, however, the experience at BHFS questions both the 
accuracy and the interpretation of the standard account, as the firm’s most 
senior partners have always worked around the clock in the service of their 
clients’ interests.  One partner shared a revealing story regarding the work 
ethos and commitment of the firm’s attorneys to their clients. 
 
[T]here was a movie years ago called Star Wars, you may remember it, 
and when Star Wars came out it was impossible to get tickets, but the four 
of us were going to go to the movie.  Norm . . . was having dinner with 
our biggest client at the time . . . probably actually the first big 
institutional client that we ever had . . . .  So I said, “Norm, I’ll go ahead 
to the theater, stand in line, get tickets.” . . .  Norm and [his wife] show up 
with [the client] . . . and Norm pulls me aside and he says “. . . [the client] 
wants to see the [movie], would you mind if I took him and you and [your 
wife] give me your tickets?”. . .  [T]hat’s just a tiny example of the 
extraordinary things that we did. . . .  Norm is a force majeure in that 
regard, and what he does for our clients is staggering, and it’s just been a 
growth of that concept of a willingness to do what’s necessary and way 
more than what’s necessary. . .  I find it hard to believe that most firms go 
that extra mile personally as well as professionally to take care of their 
clients like we do; it’s been a huge part of the culture of this firm.100
Another partner observed 
 
I had associates who told me, . . . “I [have] never seen a firm where the 
partners work as hard as they do here” . . . .  [On] Saturday mornings [it 
was] understood [that] everybody was in the office in those early 
years . . . my first year [1980,] Jack Hyatt was here every Saturday 
morning and so was I, it was just an accepted way of doing things.101
In contrast with the picture depicted by the standard story—one that 
portrays senior partners as supervising the work of a team of lawyers, 
coming in to “close the deal” and reaping the benefits of their status within 
the firm—the practice realities at BHFS suggest a different model:  a 
partner-heavy structure with lean staffing in which the most senior partners 
are intimately involved with every transaction and display a 24/7 
commitment to clients, in both the professional and personal realms.  As in 
the case of adopting a partner-heavy model, BHFS’s commitment to having 
 
 
The story, doubtless apocryphal, has long been told that when some of his partners 
urged that the office was under such pressure as to make additions to the staff 
imperative, Moore replied:  “That’s silly.  No one is under pressure.  There wasn’t 
a light on when I left at two o’clock this morning.” 
Id. at 143. 
 98. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 7. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Interview #2, supra note 46, at 5–6. 
 101. Interview #3, supra note 48, at 14. 
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partners be intimately involved with every aspect of a client’s 
representation may be more than a reflection of recent competitive practice 
realities, suggesting an alternative model of large law firm organization, 
different from the standard story’s emphasis on associate-heavy attorney 
pool with partners serving primarily in a supervisory role. 
C.  “Lost” Lawyers and Community-Minded Practice  
Another vein of the standard large law firm literature suggests a growing 
dichotomy between large law firms’ lawyers’ private and public careers.  
The claim, essentially, is that large law firm partners used to more 
commonly cross the private–public divide—serving clients and taking 
public office—but that hyper-competitive practice conditions have caused 
them to retreat from public life and from occupying positions of 
leadership.102  Moreover, not only are large law firm lawyers retreating 
from direct active participation in public life, but their representation of 
private interests has taken a client-centric turn at the expense of the public 
interest.  Increased specialization on the one hand, and commoditization, 
fragmentation, and competition on the other hand, deprive large law firm 
lawyers of the opportunity to act as lawyer-statesmen and exercise practical 
wisdom.  In his powerful book The Lost Lawyer, Anthony Kronman calls 
this a crisis not only for lawyers but for American society at large.103
To the extent that the experience of BHFS lawyers with client-driven 
lawyering embodies the hyper-competitive model of client-centered 
representation, one might have expected its lawyers to retreat from public 
life and concentrate on pursuing the private interests of their clients.  
Nothing, however, could be further from the truth.  Once again 
undermining the simplified predictions and expectations of the standard 
story of large law firms, the BHFS experience suggests the effective 
combination of 24/7 client service alongside significant commitment to 
highly visible public service. 
 
Explained one partner, 
[What] we stress more is, “be a good lawyer,” and once they’re on the 
way to being a good lawyer then be involved in the community and give 
back.  So with that said, what this practice has also [enabled] us to do is 
not only give back through dollars and through commitment, but . . . help 
Denver really become a world class city.  People ask why I did it, I really 
did because I thought it would be good for the city of Denver.104
Another partner stated, 
 
[T]he second most prideful part of this firm to me, other than its 
community and culture of care for each other, is what we’ve done in the 
 
 102. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 103. KRONMAN, supra note 79, at 271–300 (discussing the decline of the “lawyer-
statesman ideal” as lawyers have moved into large firm practice and have begun to place 
greater emphasis on monetary returns for legal services rendered); see also GLENDON, supra 
note 79, at 35–59. 
 104. Interview #12, supra note 45, at 6. 
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community . . . .  It’s just been never ending and I’m sure there are 
skeptics or critics out there, whether motivated by reason or jealousy 
[who will] say, “you know, that’s all just to promote business,” and that is 
absolutely false.  There can’t be a group of people who share a more 
common commitment to give back to the community than you’ll find in 
this firm.105
The standard story, relying on the conventional distinction between law 
and politics, suggests that increased competitive practice realities and the 
need to concentrate on rainmaking activities drove lawyers out of public 
service, politics, and leadership positions.  It also argues that the same 
competitive practice realities have caused lawyers to become more client-
centered in the sense of advocating zealously on behalf of clients with little 
regard to the interests of third parties and the public good, in turn making 
lawyers agents of private interests at the expense of acting as officers of the 
legal system and as public citizens. 
 
The BHFS story casts doubt on the validity of the standard story.  First, 
BHFS’s effective combination of traditional law practice and lobbying is 
consistent with lawyers moving in and out of public service and 
government.  And indeed, many of the firms’ lawyers have served in 
elected positions.106  Second, the BHFS experience questions the simplistic 
divide between private interests and the public good, implying that effective 
representation of clients’ private interests may be consistent with the public 
good.  And it also suggests that Kronman may have underestimated the 
ability of lawyers to influence their clients to pursue private interests in the 
public spirit.107
Academics often seek unified grand theories to explain complex 
phenomena on the ground,
  Finally, while acknowledging the shift of power from 
lawyers to clients and, in particular, the diminished likelihood and ability of 
some large law firms’ partners to directly assume positions of public 
leadership, the BHFS story nonetheless suggests that even a demanding 
professional practice may still be consistent with serving the public interest 
by undertaking significant commitments to the community in less visible 
direct roles, such as service on boards, volunteering, and financial support 
of charitable causes. 
108 and scholars of the legal profession have long 
sought, unsuccessfully, to offer a theory of firm growth that explains the 
organization and growth patterns of large law firms.109
 
 105. Interview #2, supra note 
  The standard story 
of large law firms assumes a corporate law and transactional emphasis, a 
large corporate entity client base, and a tournament theory model which in 
turn predicts associate-heavy attorney base and a lawyer-centric internal 
46, at 31. 
 106. See, e.g., supra note 69; infra note 132. 
 107. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 108. Cf. Andrew L. Kaufman, A Commentary on Pepper’s “The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical 
Role,” 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 651 (criticizing legal ethics theorist Stephen Pepper for 
debating grand theories of lawyering without being sensitive enough to the rich practice 
realities confronting actual lawyers). See generally M.B.E. Smith, Should Lawyers Listen to 
Philosophers About Legal Ethics?, 9 LAW & PHIL. 67 (1990). 
 109. Burk & McGowan, supra note 5. 
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growth engine.  But the inability of the standard story to explain the 
complex and rich world of large law firms is not an indication that the 
growth of large law firms is chaotic and unprincipled.  Rather, large law 
firm growth predictably follows client demand and needs.  If law firms’ 
organic growth patterns appear to defy one-size-fits-all theoretical 
explanations, such as the standard story, it is because context matters110
III.  THE REVISED STANDARD STORY QUESTIONED:  
THE BHFS EXPERIENCE 
:  
different firms represent different types of clients with varying needs, which 
change over time. 
Second generation large law firm scholarship recognizes the richness of 
actual large law firm practice realities and its diversity of approaches to 
firm organization and growth.111  For example, in The Elastic Tournament:  
A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, Galanter and Henderson 
document some of the structural changes experienced by large law firms, 
including the introduction of new non-partnership and equity partnership 
tracks, and the rejection of the traditional “up-or-out” probation period.112
A.  From Organic to Smart Strategic Growth 
  
Yet the scholarship insists on retaining some of the basic assumptions of the 
standard story, such as its emphasis on corporate law practice, non-partner-
heavy structure, and role of the internal growth engine, in explaining firm 
growth.  At its core, therefore, even the elastic or revised standard story is 
lawyer-centric, in the sense that it does not pay sufficient attention to the 
diverse needs of different types of clients, which, in turn, may give rise to 
different types of large law firm structures and growth patterns. 
In its early years, BHFS followed an organic growth pattern.  One partner 
noted, “we grew to [meet] client needs, we didn’t grow because we wanted 
to grow.”113  As the firm grew, however, it became obvious to many of its 
partners that the firm reached a tipping point, a juncture in which reliance 
on organic growth would be imprudent.  Explained that partner:  “[R]eal 
estate is a [volatile] industry, and we needed to have other capacities that 
even our existing real estate clients needed, [such as] securities and 
corporate work.”114
 
 110. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 469–70 
(1990) (arguing that despite the prominence of legal realism in the “abstract realm of legal 
theory” and judicial interpretation, “[c]uriously neglected has been any systematic 
investigation of the effect of core realist insights on traditional understandings of the 
lawyer’s role”).  For a discussion of legal realism’s effect on contemporary legal thought, see 
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 467 (1988) (book review). 
  He further noted, “[W]e don’t want to shrink to the 
point where we can’t take on those big transactions, but it’s difficult to 
 111. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 112. See generally Galanter & Henderson, supra note 7. 
 113. Interview #3, supra note 48, at 13. 
 114. Id. at 7. 
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sustain the number of people we have.”115
[W]e kind of evolved our own self and after a while [we] kind of [got] to 
answer those questions: . . . what do we want to be, where are we going, 
what’s important to us, what makes sense, are [we] happy doing what 
[we]’re doing, is this the thing we want to do?  [We got] into all those 
things, but that wasn’t something we did [initially].  We were just three 
kids, liked each other, decided to take a shot, and it worked out.
  A second partner explicitly 
described the shift from organic to strategic thinking: 
116
As the firm grew organically, it began to experience the need to diversify 
its practice areas and, in particular, establish bona fide corporate and 
litigation departments for four interrelated reasons.  First, its practice, 
centered around commercial real estate, entailed significant cycles that 
followed the ebbs and flows of the economy.
 
117
Second, the firm’s elite reputation in commercial real estate and lobbying 
created opportunities that the firm could not take advantage of without the 
development of robust corporate and litigation departments.  Serving some 
of their real estate and lobbying clients’ smaller corporate and litigation 
needs was but the tip of the iceberg—the firm was referring away work it 
could not handle on its own.  The firm’s growing standing could have 
allowed it to leverage its reputation and cross over to the mainstream 
practice areas of corporate work and litigation, if it could only build 
corporate and litigation departments.
  As a smaller law firm, 
under the fiscally tight regime of Jack Hyatt, it was able to withstand the 
cycles.  But as the firm grew (and Jack retired), the need arose to diversify 
its practice areas to create profit centers that would be less dependent on 
business cycles and the economy. 
118
Third, as the firm developed a new generation of younger partners, 
concerns about Norm’s and Steve’s retirement and the survival of the firm 
as a large entity suggested not only the fostering of a second generation of 
leading commercial real estate and lobbying attorneys, but also expansion 
into and the development of additional profit centers, including but not 
limited to corporate and litigation. 
 
Finally, for Norm and Steve, the transformation of the firm from a small 
walk-in law firm to one with a regional and national presence was more 
than they could have imagined, providing ample incentives to remain with 
the firm.  For the second and third generation firm partners, however, the 
situation was potentially quite different.  Especially in an era of increased 
mobility, defections, and reduced loyalty, the firm had to offer compelling 
justifications for its younger superstars to stay.  It had to develop a vision 
 
 115. Id. at 23. 
 116. Interview #10, supra note 66, at 9. 
 117. Interview #3, supra note 48, at 24–25 (“[R]eal estate always has been a cyclical 
business, we couldn’t be as dependent on it as we were in the ’80s and be the size we are.  
You can’t support this many people on one industry . . . .”). 
 118. On law firms’ crossing over—leveraging expertise in narrow areas of the law to 
expand to more mainstream practice areas—see Wald, supra note 7, at 1833–41; Wald, 
supra note 31, at 914–18. 
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and a strategic plan beyond being a real estate boutique and a lobbying 
shop. 
While the details may vary across large law firms, BHFS’s story may be 
representative of large law firms more generally in terms of the inherent 
limits of organic growth, the growing pains of pursuing strategic growth, 
the shift from a first to a second generation law firm and, relatedly, 
transitioning from the ability to rely on the loyalty of name, founding, and 
rainmaking partners to the reality of the need to continuously provide 
compelling incentives for powerful partners to stay with the firm. 
Yet growing strategically is easier said than done.  The firm’s experience 
reveals the inherent difficulties facing a law firm trying to grow 
strategically as opposed to organically.  Indeed, it showcases that the mere 
decision to grow strategically is far from obvious or conflict-free.  On the 
one hand, some of the benefits of strategic growth are apparent—for 
example, the diversification of practice areas reduces the risk inherent in 
being dependent on one practice area.119  As one partner stated, “[T]he firm 
was not as dependent on real estate in the last seven or eight years as it was 
in the ’80s and ’90s, and . . . that’s been very good in terms of how we’ve 
weathered this recession.”120
[A]s we’ve gotten bigger and overhead has gotten bigger . . . we’ve raised 
our rates and we have gotten to the point where we’re very expensive for 
a local developer and we’re . . . pricing ourselves out of doing local work 
and all we can do is handle national type transactions.  That’s a real 
concern.  In the old days, we’d bill attorney fees, but we would wait until 
the closing to get paid because there wasn’t any money to be paid 
with; . . . that flexibility certainly existed in the ’80s.  I don’t know how 
flexible we are on that these days; we’re less flexible certainly. . . .  [W]e 
really need two sets of rates, one for local clients and one for national 
clients. . . .  [W]e haven’t found an institutional solution to that, and that’s 
a concern.
  On the other hand, strategic growth also 
entails costs of its own.  Explained one partner, 
121
Moreover, strategic growth may give rise to intra-firm conflicts of 
interest among and between various constituencies within the firm, over 
ideology, competing visions of growth and practice, and compensation.
 
122  
Transforming ancillary departments that historically supported profit-
centers within the firm into independent profit-generating units requires 
significant practice and personnel changes.  Turning, for example, a state-
law-based, trial oriented litigation department into a federal-law-based, trial 
and motion practice department entails not only a shift in vision but also 
different skills and consequently personnel and compensation changes.123
 
 119. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 
 
16, at 322–39. 
 120. Interview #3, supra note 48, at 25–26. 
 121. Interview #4, supra note 40, at 10–11. 
 122. See generally MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL:  THE FALL OF A WALL 
STREET LAWYER (2004). 
 123. See, e.g., Heather Cole, Shook Renews Corporate Recruiting Efforts, MO. LAW. 
WKLY., Oct. 8, 2007, available at http://www.lawyersweekly.com/reprints/shook1.htm. 
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1.  Strategically Growing a Large Law Firm, Federal-Court-Based, 
Profit-Generating Litigation Department 
The firm evolved as a real estate boutique, with Norm, Steve, and Jack 
moving away from litigation as soon as they could afford to.  In a sense, in 
having little interest in and regard for litigation, the firm followed the spirit 
of the Cravath model:  just as litigation to Paul D. Cravath symbolized the 
failure of prudent transactional work,124
Under John Madden’s leadership, the litigation department evolved as an 
informal and decentralized practice group, focused on trying state law 
cases, an adjunct unit to the real estate department, primarily serving the 
construction litigation needs of the firm’s real estate clients.  It was not 
expected to produce its own clients, nor to become an independent profit 
center:  “[O]ur litigation group was general commercial litigation; a lot of it 
was real estate.  [A]lmost all the cases were coming from real estate clients, 
but we were always looking to get into other areas of law.”
 it symbolized the failure of a 
successful real estate transaction to BHFS. 
125
[O]bviously, as business for the firm grew . . . a lot of it involved 
litigation, and litigation was always viewed around here as 
the . . . stepchild of the firm because it never made as much 
money . . . .  [L]itigation started to grow . . . .  One of the beauties of 
litigation is you get to learn about different areas with each new case, but 
that can become overwhelming.
  Instead, it 
was focused on actual trial work, suing on behalf of, and defending, the 
firm’s clients. 
126
The litigation department grew organically for a while, primarily serving 
the trial needs of the firm’s real estate clients. 
 
[O]ur first associate was a guy named Jimmy Mandel . . . .  He was our 
first law clerk, and then our first associate, and our first associate to 
actually become a partner [coming up through the firm].  So Jimmy 
helped me [in litigation], but as it continued to grow and got out of 
hand . . . [we hired] John Madden.127
Over time, the litigation department continued to grow steadily.  One 
partner recalled that several young litigators joined the firm during that 
period.
 
128  Such an ancillary, state-court-based model suited John Madden 
and his cohort at the litigation department because the lawyers in the 
department thought of themselves as trial lawyers.129
 
 124. The Cravath System was explicitly built on the notion of serving the corporate 
client’s interests in the conference room, as opposed to the courtroom. 1 SWAINE, supra note 
  The ancillary image 
of the litigation department also fit the position of the firm in the local and 
11, at 573 (“Cravath had no instinct for litigation.  On its merits he thought it was something 
to be avoided at any reasonable price; and he had neither liking nor capacity for courtroom 
forensics.  Cravath’s forum was the conference room.”). 
 125. Interview #3, supra note 48, at 8. 
 126. Interview #2, supra note 46, at 14. 
 127. Id. at 14–15. 
 128. Id. at 17. 
 129. Interview #27, in Denver, Colo. (Aug. 4, 2010), at 22–24, 26–38. 
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national markets.  On the national scene, the department did not see itself 
and was not capable of handling major business litigation and competing 
with the large firms on the East and West coasts.  Indeed, even in Colorado, 
it played second fiddle to the well-established home-grown large law firms 
and their litigation departments:  Sherman & Howard; Davis, Graham & 
Stubbs; Holme Roberts & Owen (now part of Bryan Cave); and Holland & 
Hart. 
The first strategic change in the litigation department was a gradual shift 
from an informal structure with a nominal head, to a more hierarchical 
organization under a department head.  Contrasting the informal managerial 
style of the litigation department’s first chair with that of the subsequent 
department chair, one partner recalled that the first department chair “is a 
very, very smart lawyer, [he] hates preparation, he’s [of] the Irving 
Andrews school,130 he’s good on his feet, a very quick thinker, [but] lack[s] 
organization and lack[s] preparation.”131
Tom [Strickland]
  Moreover, 
132 came, and then Tom started bringing on a lot of his 
[litigator] friends including Stan Garnet . . . .  Well, [our chair’s] lack of 
organization and preparation and hands on [approach] was a 
disaster . . . but then when Stan came along . . . Stan became the first head 
of litigation that was much more . . . traditional . . . and really tried to 
organize things.133
The lateral hiring of an experienced large law firm litigator symbolized a 
second strategic paradigm shift for the firm’s litigation department.  The 
lateral attorney had a vision of the litigation department as an independent 
profit center, capable of generating its own clients and developing the 
capacity to serve the primary litigation needs of large entity clients in state 
and, increasingly, federal courts.  This vision entailed abandoning a 
commitment to the role of litigators as predominantly trial attorneys, and 
the development of litigators as strategic motion pleaders who, while trying 
cases when necessary, would settle many of their cases instead.  Noted one 
partner, “[H]e has really changed it and brought us into the big leagues.”
 
134
The new head of litigation at the firm explained the paradigm shift, and 
the firm’s explicitly strategic decision to try to build its litigation 
department. 
 
[T]he idea was that the litigation practice had always been sort of an 
adjunct to the real estate practice, it had really been servicing the real 
estate clients when they had litigation needs . . . obviously, because it was 
 
 130. Irving Andrews was a legendary Colorado trial attorney. See E. Michael Canges & 
Alfred C. Harrell, Irving P. Andrews, COLO. LAW., July 2009, at 31, available at 
http://www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl_articles.cfm?articleid=6117. 
 131. Interview #2, supra note 46, at 16. 
 132. Tom Strickland, a former BHFS name partner, was Colorado’s U.S. Attorney from 
1999 to 2001.  Strickland subsequently was a partner at another large law firm and served as 
Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish, Wildlife and Parks. Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior for Fish, Wildlife and Parks Thomas L. Strickland, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, 
http://www.doi.gov/archive/bio/strickland_bio.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). 
 133. Interview #2, supra note 46, at 18–19. 
 134. Id. at 21. 
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mostly real estate practice, it was a relatively modest, state court practice.  
So a small part of the firm didn’t really originate a lot of business, there 
weren’t a lot clients that were attracted to the firm for its litigation, they 
were more real estate clients that were in the firm for the real estate 
representation and then have a litigation need arise, and the real estate 
lawyers would direct the clients to their litigation partners in the firm.  
[Our challenge] was to build more of a larger case, a federal court type 
practice . . . in the hopes that we would generate clients through our 
litigation practice for whom we would also provide non-litigation work, 
real estate work, corporate work, tax, lobbying and so we’d be a source of 
organic business, not just a service arm of the existing real estate 
business . . . .135
Executing such a paradigm shift was not an easy task.  Recalled the same 
partner, “the first few years it didn’t work out well . . . .  [T]here were 
people who were invested in the way things [were], [and] had absolutely no 
interest in changing that . . . .”
 
136
if we were going to build something [new] we [were] going to have to 
build it on our own without those [old school] guys, and on the side, and 
so that’s what we started doing.  We hired our own people, we operated 
completely separately, they had nothing [to] do with us, we had nothing to 
do with them, and so [we] basically built up [a separate, parallel 
litigation] practice on the sidelines and over time it eclipsed the existing, 
more service-oriented part of the litigation practice and people started to 
see that a litigator could have organic business . . . .  [A]nd so then when 
the [old school partners] left we completed the takeover of 
the . . . litigation practice . . . .
  The partner added that 
137
The push to build a litigation department in the style of a large law firm 
came from the upper ranks of the firm.  Recalled the litigation department 
chair, “Norm said ‘We should go hire the best guy there is,’”
 
138
Where they [existing members of the litigation department] miscalculated 
was, and where [we] miscalculated was, that we [all] thought a 
collaboration like that could be among equals.  [I]t didn’t work out that 
way, egos got in the way . . . .  [A]nd it created real problems for all 
because some of the corporate people and real estate people . . . were 
colleagues, they were [the] same age and they were on the committees 
and they were running the firm together . . . .
 yet the 
support from the top could not and did not alleviate the tension between the 
newly recruited lateral litigators and the existing members of the litigation 
department, both in terms of personality and vision for the litigation 
department.  That partner described the personality clashes that ensued, 
notwithstanding the commitment of all partners at the litigation department 
to work together on a smooth transition and transformation: 
139
 
 135. Interview #21, in Denver, Colo. (June 30, 2010), at 1. 
 
 136. Id. at 10. 
 137. Id. at 10–11. 
 138. Id. at 12. 
 139. Id. at 12–13. 
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Over time, the large law firm vision of litigation won over, crowding out 
the ancillary model.  Continued the new head of litigation at the firm: 
I came from a big firm, big case, litigation practice and all that goes with 
that, hard work, real commitment to the clients and to the matters, an 
expectation of extremely high quality work product, . . . bringing people 
who come from major national litigation practices where they were 
successful and grew up in those environments where they were inculcated 
with that kind of a culture and armed with a team of people like that.  The 
vision is to go out and convince clients here [in Denver and Colorado] as 
well as nationally—and probably more nationally—that we can deliver 
the same quality litigation representation as those firms.  In fact, we do it 
with the same people that they had at those [national] firms—not people 
who we say could have worked at those firms, they did work at those 
firms and now they’re with us.  So we can deliver for you the same people 
that you’d be hiring at those firms and we can do it more efficiently and 
get you the same results . . . .140
The strategic goals of the reconstituted litigation department were 
twofold.  The department sought to capture the synergies created by the 
firm’s real estate and lobbying practices, representing existing clients in 
major complex litigations outside of the real estate realm.  Moreover, it 
aimed to gradually establish the litigation department as a strong local and 
national presence that would be able to compete with the established 
Colorado firms for major Denver-based litigation and with national firms 
for complex state and federal practice. 
 
So . . . that’s the vision: . . . .  First and foremost . . . to have the people 
that we could legitimately say to them [large corporate clients], we really 
can do this . . . .  The next step . . . is to really establish ourselves as a firm 
that can be looked to to deliver on what that promise is.  So now we’re 
ready to take that show on the road [and develop a national 
practice] . . . .  [O]ne of the things it depends on is having people like 
Norm, and there’s three or four others in the firm like him who have 
relationships around the country. . . .  [N]ational relationships so that we 
really have an opportunity to knock on doors all over the country and 
make this pitch . . . .141
The strategically designed litigation department began to grow and 
generate significant profits.
 
142
[I]t’s my fervent desire that I not be the number one guy.  I would love to 
be number eight because that would mean that we were making a pile of 
money and I would have lots and lots of money and so it doesn’t have to 
[be] all about me . . . .
  The success of the department allowed its 
proponents to further the model by making additional, high-profile lateral 
hires.  Explained the chair of the litigation department, 
143
Referring to two subsequent prominent lateral hires, he opined that 
 
 
 140. Id. at 17. 
 141. Id. at 17–18. 
 142. Id. at 11. 
 143. Id. at 15. 
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the problem [was] that [the first lateral hire] got a very successful practice 
and so he hasn’t had a huge amount of time to mine those opportunities 
and take advantage of them. . . .  [T]he advantage of [the second lateral 
hire] was that he didn’t have a stable of clients, he didn’t have his own 
cases, but he is an exceptional lawyer . . . .  So [the second hire] really 
filled the role of being able to take cases . . . .”144
A decade or so after it launched the reorganization and re-
conceptualization of its litigation department, the department has 
established itself as a meaningful profit center within the firm, structured 
according to a large law firm vision: 
 
[Number] one, to really institutionalize the business-getting vision . . . and 
really have the mechanism in place and the successes in place so 
that . . . it’s self-sustaining; and number two, to identify, recruit, hire, and 
promote within the firm the next guy who’s going to really be the face 
of . . . litigation . . . .145
It has also succeeded in establishing itself as a meaningful presence 
locally, regionally, and nationally.
 
146
Explained one partner: 
  Finally, it has positioned itself 
strategically for additional growth.  Having cemented itself as a leading 
litigation department in Denver’s mid-market economy as well as a 
competitive national actor, the department’s next strategic move was to 
grow and compete in selective mid-market and specialty subject-matter 
niches, avoiding a head-on collision with established large national and 
global law firms on their home turf of large market cities such as New 
York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. 
California is tricky because we’re not going to compete with Latham [& 
Watkins] and [O’Melveny & Myers] . . . .  So like we did with the water 
[industry] where we have a strategic market position where we’re a 
dominant player in that little niche market, we have to have basic 
commercial litigation capability in order to capture the litigation from 
some of the other clients that we have or we’re going to have out there.147
Such strategic vision suggests, in turn, a particular growth model:  on the 
one hand, avoiding the large scale, heavy-on-paperwork litigations in large 
markets, which are the bread and butter of associate-heavy established large 
law firm litigation departments, would allow BHFS’s litigation department 
 
 
 144. Id. at 15–16. 
 145. Id. at 26. 
 146. Id. at 24–25.  Measuring and ranking elite litigation firms or departments is, in 
historical context, a recent phenomenon.  Indeed, when it rose in the late nineteenth century, 
the elite large law firm was very much transactional and corporate-law-focused, and tended 
to look with disdain at litigation. See Wald, supra note 7, at 1833 n.138; see also GLENDON, 
supra note 79, at 42 (“The barrister ethos in the United States even today retains some flavor 
of the cultures of ghetto Catholics and Jews who were long excluded from elite firms.  
Litigation is now a respected specialty within high-status firms, but the habits and attitudes 
of litigators remain somewhat different from those of the transactional lawyers down the 
hall.”); 1 SWAINE, supra note 11, at 554–55 (describing the prevailing understanding of 
transactional work as “more profitable and satisfactory” than litigation). 
 147. Interview #21, supra note 135, at 30. 
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to remain nimble, partner heavy, and cost-effective.  On the other hand, 
competing in specialty niches and in cutting-edge litigation matters would 
enable the litigation department to generate high profit margins and attract 
high-quality lateral hires. 
2.  Strategically Growing a Large Law Firm, Profit-Generating, 
Corporate Law Department 
The transformation of BHFS’s litigation department provides a window 
into some of the inherent challenges facing a law firm transitioning from an 
organic to a strategic growth model:  intra-firm conflicts over practice 
vision, skill, recruitment, and compensation.  Yet even absent intra-firm 
conflict, shifting from an organic to a strategic model is a time-consuming, 
risky proposition that may require more than one attempt before it succeeds, 
as illustrated by the experience of BHFS’s corporate department. 
Initially, organic growth led to an expanded corporate client base as well 
as increased specialization and expertise.  For example, Steve’s growing 
reputation in Colorado landed the firm its first bank client, and the 
representation of complex commercial real estate clients allowed corporate 
attorneys to develop unique expertise in cutting-edge financing methods.  
Yet the department still lacked grounding in the fundamentals of business 
law, general corporate law, securities law, and mergers and acquisitions. 
As was the case with its litigation department, the firm attempted to 
laterally recruit partner-level talent to establish and build its corporate law 
department.  Whereas its litigation experience demonstrated both the 
challenges of pursuing a new vision and dealing with personnel committed 
to the old vision, the initial experience of the corporate law department 
illustrated another difficult aspect of pursuing strategic growth—the 
difficulty of recruiting and retaining successful large law firm rainmakers to 
build up a department, and of building a corporate client base in a 
competitive market for legal services.  Recalled one partner, 
[W]e went through a lot of effort and interviews, and I think at that time it 
was very hard to get people from outside Denver to come because the 
firm was so small, and I think most people with corporate and securities 
experience got it in large firms and couldn’t quite envision how they were 
going to continue to do that work with one or two associates . . . in a small 
firm.148
Its first attempt to grow strategically was to bring in talent from the elite 
law firms of Skadden Arps and Kirkland & Ellis to establish and develop 
the corporate department.  One partner recalled that the managing partner 
had “been very busy with bringing in lateral transactional lawyers which is 
certainly the first step.”
 
149
[W]e started to hire ex-Skadden people when Skadden went through a 
period where they wouldn’t bring anybody in as a partner.  So we started 
to get into that area, took companies public, and so I started expanding 
  And another partner noted, 
 
 148. Interview #3, supra note 48, at 7. 
 149. Interview #21, supra note 135, at 31. 
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beyond real estate into corporate and that was a very exciting thing for me 
because I got to do big deals and the firm was steadily growing.150
A partner recruited laterally to help build the corporate law department 
explained:  “[W]hat Brownstein Hyatt wanted to do was grow a corporate 
finance department, and they decided the best way to do that was to bring in 
lawyers from major law firms; national law firms . . . I was about the thirty-
fifth lawyer [at the firm in 1994].”
 
151
We did a lot of . . . small private placements for people.  A lot of it was 
relationship driven; people that Norm and Steve knew and they had never 
been able to do that type of work for before.  They always had to refer it 
to other people in town.  As we got bigger, we were fortunate to bring in 
two young partners from [Kirkland &] Ellis who were similarly looking 
for kind of a change of lifestyle; raise their families out here.  And they 
brought with them some work that they were able to continue doing, 
principally leveraged buyout[s].
  The department grew incrementally, 
initially building on the firm’s existing practice and clients. 
152
The strategic buildup of a department, in contrast to organic growth was 
not, of course, unique to BHFS.  Indeed, one of the partners laterally 
recruited to help build the firm’s corporate law department recalled an 
earlier career move he made from a well-established elite law firm to 
another Wall Street law firm, which was engaged in the strategic transition 
of its limited M&A department to a full service corporate law 
department
 
153
[W]e were trying to start up a new department; a new area of expertise 
within a firm that was already well known for certain things but not across 
the board. . . .  I think that on the transactional side, the reputation was 
that the work was spotty or uneven or we weren’t very experienced in that 
area, and so it was sort of fun to be part of the group that changed that 
perception of us.
: 
154
The partner added that his former firm’s strategic growth 
 
started more on the debt side with the junk bonds, but gradually we got 
into equity, which is kind of the more prestigious, premier stuff to do; the 
IPOs and public offerings for existing companies . . . [the other firm, 
Skadden Arps’s] biggest problem was we were really expensive and it 
was hard to break in and say, “Pay us just as much or more as you’re 
going to pay Cravath or Sullivan & Cromwell” when they have the blue 
ribbon experience in this.155
 
 150. Interview #13, supra note 
 
47, at 2. 
 151. Interview #20, supra note 85, at 2. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See CAPLAN, supra note 11, at 87–117; Wald, supra note 7, at 1835–36 (describing 
the transformation of Skadden’s specialized mergers, acquisitions, and takeover practice into 
a general corporate law department). 
 154. Interview #20, supra note 85, at 2. 
 155. Id. at 10.  Interviewee #4 also pointed out that high fees and pricing oneself out of 
the market is a concern. See supra text accompanying note 121. 
2012] LARGE LAW FIRMS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2903 
Similarly, the newly constituted corporate law department at BHFS 
began by relying on existing firm contacts and clients and, in particular, on 
its expertise in commercial real estate finance to transition to both 
mainstream and more prestigious corporate work. 
We did some work for some very small underwriters.  We did a lot of 
private placements for various things.  A lot of them were real estate 
projects; real estate development projects where in the past the real estate 
lawyers might have done those deals but it made more sense for corporate 
people [to handle them].  We [corporate attorneys] understood better how 
to create the securities . . . .  [W]e did find it very difficult to break into 
the investment banking underwriter’s side. . . .  It just came piecemeal and 
then, like I said, when the Kirkland & Ellis guys came two years later, 
that was really the watershed when we were able to break into the private 
equity world.156
Moreover, commenting on the difficulty of shifting from representing 
primarily developers to a more balanced corporate practice serving some 
lenders and corporate entities, a corporate partner noted, 
 
It was much more on the developer’s side. . . .  [D]efinitely much more 
development work. . . .  [I]n that period of time when you represent[ed] a 
private equity firm, you basically . . . knew you [were] dealing with a law 
firm in whatever town the company that they are investing in [is 
located] . . . .  [W]e definitely deal more with lawyers outside of Denver 
than in Denver overall. . . .  [T]here was definitely a period where our 
reputation within law firms was bigger outside of Denver than it was 
inside of Denver. . . .  [The firm] . . . wanted to really focus on getting a 
broader mix and trying to do more with the local clients than we do.157
The department grew slowly, experiencing the turmoil inherent with 
lateral hires.  After opportunistically recruiting three Skadden Arps 
attorneys who “almost made partner but didn’t quite,”
 
158
[that] was really where I knew this was going to work, because at that 
point the other two had left and I was really the only partner-level person. 
. . .  The other Skadden people had left in the first year that I was here, 
and the [Kirkland & Ellis] guys came eighteen months to two years after I 
was here.
 the firm laterally 
acquired several attorneys from Kirkland & Ellis, only to see a few of these 
lawyers leave in short order.  Eventually, however, the new hires settled in, 
and one partner noted 
159
As with its litigation counterpart, the firm’s corporate department began 
developing into a large-firm-style full-service department within a decade 
or so of pursuing a strategic growth model.  And just like its litigation 
counterpart, the corporate law department then faced the challenges of 
further strategic growth, as it transitioned from being an adjunct service unit 
 
 
 156. Interview #20, supra note 85, at 17–18. 
 157. Id. at 18–19. 
 158. Id. at 13. 
 159. Id. at 18. 
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into its new identity and role as a profit center competing in regional, 
national, and global markets. 
[O]ur next obvious [development] within the corporate group is to have a 
corporate presence in Los Angeles, probably through a lateral hire or 
multiple hires, and so that gives us kind of our first major city presence in 
the corporate arena . . . .  [T]hat’s . . . the next challenge and next level 
that we want to get to.  In terms of what we’re doing in Denver, we’re 
where we want to be and I think we’re positioned as the premium local 
firm for more complex corporate work.  [W]e really compete more for 
business with the national firms than we do with the local 
firms . . . because the national firms and we have a broader practice 
experience in complicated M&A transactions and private equity work and 
that type of stuff. . . .  It’s just the experience of the lawyers in the 
group.160
B.  The Transformation and Institutionalization of Law Firm Management   
 
The firm’s autocratic managerial style, embodied by founding partner 
Jack Hyatt,161
some of the meetings in the old days, we’d have a partnership meeting, 
and Jack Hyatt would go through the ledger cards and we would talk 
about every single client we had.  We’d go to two or three in the morning 
and you had to say what’s going on, or why isn’t this bill paid.  I do not 
miss those days.
 focused on fiscal conservatism, featured informal and 
personal attitudes, and employed a well-intending and purportedly fair yet 
secretive compensation structure with due deference to the founding 
members of the firm.  The firm’s early management style relied on the fact 
that Jack knew what everybody else was doing, had a relationship of trust 
with and the backing of Norm and Steve, and was well regarded as a tough 
yet fair manager.  That style served the small and growing firm well for 
nearly two and a half decades until Jack’s retirement in 1991.  For example, 
in a day and age where law was still regarded by many, both within and 
outside of the profession, as a vocation beyond simply a for-profit venture, 
and many law firms were run in a casual, relaxed manner, the young firm 
had an unusually explicit business perspective.  Under Jack’s fiscally 
conservative management vision, the firm stayed clear of incurring debt, 
was very conscientious of expenses, and created an image that was not 
opulent.  One partner observed that at 
162
Recalled a partner involved with management, 
 
I wanted to make sure that on everybody’s birthday, they got a check to 
know that the firm thought about them.  I wanted to make certain that we 
always had the best possible pension plans, health insurance, that people 
 
 160. Id. at 21–22. 
 161. Interview #4, supra note 40, at 18 (“Jack ruled like [Vladimir] Putin does, I mean 
very much of an autocrat.”). 
 162. Interview #2, supra note 46, at 32. 
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were recognized for their service, treated like family, that everybody 
always felt that they were treated properly . . . .163
The sheer growth of the firm, its expansion to new fields of practice and 
new locations, called for a different kind of managerial style:  strategic and 
flexible rather than organic, risk-averse, and conservative; transparent rather 
than secretive; professionalized and institutionalized rather than intuitive; 
and embracive and consultative, at least of the opinions and interests of 
powerful partners other than Norm and Steve, if still centralized. 
 
The transition from an informal, organic managerial model, in which a 
powerful name partner naturally assumed the managerial helm, to a 
strategic model was a gradual one.  One partner described the process by 
which the firm came to realize the need to make this shift: 
We went from three to six [lawyers, in 1972] to twelve [in 1976] to about 
18 [in 1980] and we could see it coming.  And after a point in time I 
finally recognized after being through [a] couple of these downturns that 
you have to have the staff when things come back because it’s too late 
when a guy walks in and there’s only 17 of you and he needs nine lawyers 
and you don’t have them.  You can say, “I’ll go get them” and do it, but 
that doesn’t work, and so you have to be a little ahead of it too.  So there 
came a point in time when I recognized when we started to have these 
downturns, as I could see things would turn up a little bit I said we have 
an opportunity here, we can pick up four or five guys that are really good 
guys that are out there, we don’t quite have the work here, but I think that 
[in] three, four, five, six months we will . . . .164
Relatedly, the growth of the firm made apparent the need to 
institutionalize and reform the firm’s informal and organic compensation 
structure: 
 
[W]hen we first started—inexperienced and childlike [are the words I’ll 
use to describe] our understanding of how partnerships operated.  [W]e 
assumed this was a “one for all, all for one” operation, and so the three of 
us, every week we’ll split it whatever it is and if someone works harder or 
does [more] . . . we never even thought about that, we just said “hey, 
we’re together, we’ll split it.”  When we added people, we came from that 
mentality where we’d like everybody to be equal . . . .165
Over time, however, the partners came to realize that the firm’s informal 
compensation structure ill-fitted its new size and objectives. 
 
[B]ut as we added partners . . . we began to see that people have different 
strengths and weaknesses . . . [and that] we can’t just take a piece of pie 
and just say, add three guys and ultimately they’ll all be the same because 
they’re not the same, there are distinctions, people are different, and then 
you started thinking, well there’s seniority, there’s hard workers, there’s 
client getting, there’s community stuff, there’s whatever it involves to run 
the firm, and so we finally decided that we would meet as new partners as 
 
 163. Interview #10, supra note 66, at 7. 
 164. Id. at 12. 
 165. Id. at 18. 
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we got bigger, that we would determine what partnership shares were as a 
group . . . .166
Similarly, the firm’s informal approach to department structure and 
leadership was becoming an obvious constraint on its growth: 
 
We didn’t have departments back then in any real organizational sense, 
and so there was a time when Stan and I were the co-heads of the 
litigation department, but that didn’t mean anything, we didn’t do 
anything.  It really wasn’t until a couple of years ago when [the firm’s 
managing partner] reorganized the firm that we had any meaningful 
hierarchy; so I spent no meaningful time involved in management, I was 
really just doing my practice.167
C.  The Challenges of Strategic Growth 
 
The standard story of large law firms emphasizes the supply side of the 
market for legal services—lawyers, explaining law firm growth organically 
in terms of a tournament of lawyers, lawyers’ social and cultural capital, 
attitudes toward risk and diversification and relational bonds.  In the 
historical context of the exponential growth of large law firms, between 
1945 and the mid-1980s, initially on Wall Street and over time outside of 
New York, the story makes ample sense.  Large law firms were relatively 
small, and as corporate clients and their legal needs grew significantly, a 
focus on lawyers and their conduct (as opposed to the demand side, which 
the standard story assumes or takes for granted) did explain the growth 
patterns of law firms. 
The assumptions made by the standard story, however, make much less 
sense in the world of large law firms since the 1980s.  As clients grew in 
sophistication, and large law firms grew in number and in size, a model that 
assumed and relied on increased corporate client demand for legal services 
and therefore focused on lawyers and organic growth was bound to fail. 
The experience of BHFS is revealing in this regard.  In its early years, the 
firm grew organically, emerging as a real estate and lobbying boutique.  By 
the time it came of age in the 1980s, however, it could no longer rely on 
robust client demand and organic growth.  To survive and flourish, it had to 
transition to a strategic model of growth based on effective and aggressive 
service of client needs in an increasingly competitive market for legal 
services, regionally, nationally, and globally.  Relying on lean staffing and a 
partner-heavy model, BHFS built on its niche practice areas and expertise 
to transform into a general practice large law firm offering high quality, 
cutting-edge expertise for competitive fees, taking advantage of its lower 
mid-market overheads and costs while laterally recruiting large-market 
attorneys. 
While the details of strategic growth models may vary, one general 
conclusion does emerge:  the days of passive large law firms relying on 
robust and increasing client demand to grow organically are over.  To be 
 
 166. Id. at 18–19. 
 167. Interview #21, supra note 135, at 13–14. 
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clear, large law firms are not dead and are not dying.  Indeed, relying on 
path dependencies and hard-earned reputations, some elite large law firms, 
even passive ones, may survive, even thrive for a while.  Others, however, 
will have to abandon passive organic models and adopt strategic models in 
their place. 
Some firms may strive to continue to grow, becoming true global actors 
providing services to global entities in leading capital markets such as 
London and New York.  Others will focus on servicing international and 
cross-border needs, and yet other firms will highlight regional services.  For 
some firms, growth will be a function not of geography but of services 
provided, focusing on large-scale litigations and transactions, or on 
providing cutting-edge expertise, serving essentially as high-end boutiques. 
Shifting from a passive, lawyer-centric, organic model to a dynamic, 
service centered, strategic model may be a necessity for large law firms, but 
merely being committed to transition is not going to guarantee success.  
Indeed, the BHFS experience demonstrates some of the inherent challenges 
in pursuing a strategic model:  intra-firm conflicts, resolving competing 
visions, and instability during the transition period.  And while some large 
law firms will succeed in transforming themselves, others no doubt will fail. 
IV.  THE FUTURE OF LARGE LAW FIRMS:  
SMART, MULTI-DIMENSIONAL, STRATEGIC GROWTH 
The BHFS experience contrasts in many ways with the standard story of 
large law firm growth.  This part compares the conventional wisdom with 
the alternative model for growth that BHFS followed, and which may prove 
a valuable model for other growing law firms. 
A.  The Conventional Wisdom 
The revised standard story literature offers three types of insights into the 
future of large law firms.  Some argue that the large law firm is a dying 
breed, others assert that it must grow organically in order to survive, and yet 
other commentators believe that the future of the large firm is inherently 
unstable and uncertain. 
1.  The Death of the Large Law Firm 
In The Death of Big Law, Larry Ribstein predicted the decline of large 
law firms.  Ribstein argued that “these firms need outside capital to survive, 
but lack a business model for the development of firm-specific property that 
would enable the firms to attract this capital.”  He concluded that 
[t]hese basic problems have left Big Law vulnerable to client demands for 
cheaper and more sophisticated legal products, competition among 
various providers of legal services, and national and international 
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regulatory competition.  The result is likely to be the end of the major role 
large law firms have played in the delivery of legal services.168
Professor Ribstein’s analysis relied both explicitly and implicitly on the 
standard story of large law firms and, in particular, on the prevalence of the 
tournament theory as the dominant and unique model for law firm 
organization and on its organic growth characteristic.  For example, it 
assumed that large law firms would need to grow or would perish, and that 
in order to finance such growth, firms would require outside capital.  It also 
assumed that large law firms were organized pursuant to the tournament 
theory, and that while that model was a plausible one for law firm 
governance, it lacked a compelling business justification. 
 
Yet as the experience at BHFS demonstrates, some of the very 
assumptions necessary for the conclusion of Big Law’s death are 
inaccurate, both descriptively and normatively.  Fundamentally, large law 
firms do not need to grow in order to survive; they do not need to rapidly 
add new cohorts of associates to support a growing number of partners.  
Rather, what they need is a paradigm shift, from a unitary, organic model of 
growth to a diverse array of strategic ones. 
2.  Organic Growth and Globalization 
The standard story of large law firms predicts that as corporate entities 
grow and become global actors, their law firms would need to grow 
globally in order to effectively serve their clients’ interests.  Moreover, the 
model suggests the means for such global growth:  just as large law firms 
outgrew their local offices and became true national firms with offices all 
over the country, so will they grow globally.  Indeed, a few global law firms 
have emerged that appear to follow and validate the predictions of the 
standard story.169
However, the experience of large law firms has proven much richer than 
the one predicted by the tournament theory.  The experience of BHFS, for 
example, with its shift from organic to strategic growth, demonstrates one 
possibly bright future for large law firms, which does not entail explosive 
growth.  More generally, it suggests that the future of large global law firms 
lies in moving away from a simplistic model of organic growth and 
adopting client-driven strategic models.  Indeed, preliminary evidence 
suggests the emergence of a multitude of global growth models.
  And if that was the extent of the experience of large law 
firms, perhaps Professors Galanter and Palay’s prediction would have, in 
time, proven true. 
170
 
 168. Ribstein, supra note 
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3.  Big but Brittle 
Large law firms that follow a traditional organic growth model may find 
themselves, in the words of Burk and McGowan, big but brittle.171
Once again, BHFS’s experience suggests an alternative, more stable 
model.  Having grown strategically, the firm attempts to offer its attorneys 
opportunities that are unique in the large law firm world.  The firm’s smart 
growth and dominant positions in diverse practice areas, such as 
commercial real estate, gaming, and water law, offer lawyers in these 
departments experiences that might be hard to replicate elsewhere; and 
offers attorneys in other departments, such as litigation and corporate, the 
ability to mine the firm’s diverse clients base.  BHFS’s lobbying practice 
presents additional opportunities to take advantage of synergies that would 
be less likely to exist at firms without such a practice, and to attract clients 
by offering a comprehensive package of representation, legislative solutions 
included.  Finally, the firm’s entrepreneurial and community-oriented 
culture tends to attract similar-minded attorneys who are less committed to 
the eat what you kill ethos, and who are therefore less likely to leave the 
firm solely for the pursuit of more lucrative opportunities. 
  Such 
firms, functioning as internal reciprocal referral networks in which powerful 
rainmakers refer work to each other and utilize the non-equity partner 
workforce to mine their own human capital, are brittle because in their “eat 
what you kill” culture, rainmakers will tend to leave whenever attractive 
lucrative opportunities present themselves elsewhere. 
Smart strategic growth patterns will vary, of course, from firm to firm.  
The BHFS story, however, does suggest a more general lesson:  large law 
firms that replace a passive, organic growth model with a creative, strategic 
approach stand a better chance of creating a more stable foundation for the 
future. 
B.  Smart Growth 
Even after it established more robust litigation and corporate law 
departments, BHFS faced only limited prospects for growth.  The litigation 
department faced significant competition in the local Denver market from 
the entrenched elite large law firms in town, and while many of its clients 
were national clients, its ability to compete effectively outside of Denver 
was limited, even with its lower rates and lean staffing.  Similarly, the 
corporate department’s ability to enter the already-crowded market for large 
corporate entities’ legal services, especially outside of Denver, was limited. 
Resisting what some have characterized as large law firms’ reluctance to 
adopt forward-looking strategic thinking,172
 
Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1742–44 (2006) 
(documenting increased large law firm segmentation, between elite and semi-elite firms). 
 the firm explicitly decided to 
 171. Burk & McGowan, supra note 5. 
 172. See Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management:  Complementary Visions 
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abandon its reliance on organic growth models and pursue smart strategic 
models. 
And as we’ve gotten bigger . . . [w]e [have] had lots of consultants come 
in and look, especially [after we switched from a management committee 
to a managing partner model.  Our managing partner] . . . was very good 
about really getting expert viewpoints on how to grow wisely, and so then 
what we learned from more than one of these people was that when we hit 
about seventy, eighty lawyers that for a city our size, that’s kind of a 
critical juncture and that the vast majority of firms that size don’t survive 
forever.  Once their founding partners retire, it tends not to replace itself 
[while] smaller firms continue and much larger firms continue, 
statistically.  So we made the decision [that] we need to get bigger, we 
can’t grow indefinitely just in Denver; we need to look outside.  So really 
very methodically and [in a] very business-like way, [we] looked at other 
markets and Las Vegas did seem to be a logical place for us to expand, so 
that was the first one.  [T]here was a lot of thought put into the integration 
effort and nothing [is] ever perfect, but I think really for the size firm we 
were and kind of the experience we had of never merging with anybody 
before, I think we did a really good job on the integration there and 
continue to do that, and I think the expansions since then have built on 
that.  I guess before we did Las Vegas, we [had] a small office in New 
Mexico.  That was actually first and that was a good trial run because it 
was a small number of people with a single practice, so you weren’t 
trying to integrate lawyers in multiple disciplines all at once.173
Consequently, the firm turned its attention to various avenues of smart 
strategic growth.  First, it concluded that its success in commercial real 
estate and lobbying could be built upon and replicated.  Viewed more 
broadly than subject-matter expertise, the firm’s success in bringing 
together commercial real estate and lobbying was an example of creating a 
synergy between a traditional practice area and government relations to 
offer clients a more complete array of legal solutions that other law firms 
could not offer.  The firm set about to find other law firms following the 
same model and merged with Las Vegas-based Schreck Brignone.
 
174  
Schreck Brignone featured a similar model of creating synergies between a 
traditional practice area—gaming law—and government relations.175  
BHFS also attempted to replicate its past success and growing reputation by 
establishing a state-level government relations presence in other 
jurisdictions, such as New Mexico and Nevada.176
Second, now featuring full service litigation and corporate law 
departments, the firm was strategically positioned to take advantage of its 
 
 
 173. Interview #20, supra note 85, at 3. 
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government relations and lobbying practice and use it to expand existing 
client relationships by crossing over to traditional law practices.  It therefore 
set about systematically trying to mine its existing strengths and 
relationships to cross over to the mainstream practice areas of corporate law 
and litigation.177
[T]here’s something that we have now that no firm in the western U.S. 
has . . . because Washington is so important to every[one,] business 
people want the access that we have, people want to hire us for general 
legal work knowing that we can help them on stuff in Washington, it’s 
really been quite astonishing. . . .  [W]hen somebody needs you to help 
them [lobbying] with a $20 billion problem, I can assure you I have 
leverage on getting some [traditional] legal work from them, guaranteed.  
As a matter of fact that’s what I do best, we’re not going to solve their 
[lobbying] problem and just pay us a monthly retainer, that’s not going to 
happen.
 
178
Successful crossover, and leveraging the firm’s strength in being able to 
offer effective holistic representation inclusive of lobbying, calls for careful 
building and evaluation of the firm’s capabilities.  Explained one partner, 
 
we’re still recognized as a real estate powerhouse, and I think that our 
corporate practice has come way up, but is not at that same level, 
and . . . our litigation practice has come way up, but is not at that same 
level, and . . . our natural resources practice has come way up, and is not 
at that level in Denver.  [A]nd so we have made the transition from a real 
estate and lobbying firm primarily into a full service firm.179
Importantly, effective crossover calls for not over-selling to clients the 
firm’s current capabilities, outside of its traditional areas of strength.  As 
noted by one partner, 
 
I think it’s good for the brand that there be some things that we are 
known, are preeminent in, and that in the other things, it’s important that 
we be known as right in the mix, very high quality up there with the 
others, but we don’t have to be viewed in my mind as a litigation firm.180
Third, the firm focused its attention on strategic growth in particular 
practice areas in which it had or thought it could develop a comparative 
competitive advantage.  Building on its government relations expertise and 
its subject matter expertise in water law, an important area of practice in the 
Mountain West region of the country, with significant overlay to local 
government interests (both state and municipal), the firm sought out and 
merged with the largest water law firm in California,
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subject matter expertise spanning the region.  Similarly, it tried to build on 
its expertise in the area of the oil and gas industries, to develop as a leader 
in natural resources, renewable energy and green energy—fast-growth 
industries with important connections to federal and state government 
relations.  Observed one partner, “I think that getting into different practice 
areas has really helped us not be as dependent on real estate and it will 
continue to be a good source of revenue, but it’s not going to be as high a 
percentage of the firm’s revenue.”182
[J]ust over the last three or four years, looking at the numbers, we have 
probably 15 or more partners generating very significant revenue for the 
firm, and so spreading [rainmaking capabilities] out and not being as 
dependent on one or two people as we were say 10 years ago [has been a 
positive development].
  That partner added, 
183
Fourth, as many large law firms became preoccupied with the trend of 
going global, BHFS instead secured its local and regional footing. 
 
[The managing partner] just wanted the firm to be recognized regionally 
as one of the premier firms, and for that to happen, all the departments 
had to have real visibility and presence in the major cities that we had 
markets in and offices in. . . .  [I]t was the idea that if the firm as a whole 
is going to [have] a full service, all-departments-are-strong kind of 
reputation within the region, that in itself is obviously good economically.  
But I think that was primarily what was driving the push for more local 
business.184
Of course, BHFS is not unique in choosing to emphasize and build up its 
regional presence in the face of global pressures,
 
185 yet its commitment and 
success illustrate the importance of not accepting without scrutiny 
simplified predictions about large law firms’ means of globalization.186
Finally, the firm employed strategically opportunistic thinking with 
regard to hiring, promotion, and retention of its associates and lateral 
partners.  Explained one partner, “historically we always wanted to; we 
didn’t really look to bring groups of lawyers in.  It was much more one-on-
one kind [of] recruiting.  I think that was partly because we were smaller.  
We really wanted to make sure the personality fit.”
 
187
[w]e wanted to make sure people had some other ties here before we hired 
them for a summer job, because you didn’t want them just for the 
summer, you wanted to make sure they were somebody that would 
potentially come full-time . . . and there was a lot of lateral hiring over the 
  A second partner 
observed, 
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2012] LARGE LAW FIRMS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2913 
years and some of them stayed and some didn’t, but we were just trying to 
bring in different skill sets . . . .  [W]e were always very interested in 
people from large firms who wanted a change and wanted to come to 
Denver, and so we brought some people like that and also people from 
government.188
The firm’s strategy evidenced a departure from the standard story’s 
feature of hiring a large incoming class of junior associates, with the 
expectation that most would depart, in two ways:
 
189
[F]or a while there, we didn’t hire young associates because lots . . . drop 
out . . . the chances of success with a young associate are . . . not 
great . . . .  But we’ve also gone through a lot of lateral hires; . . . those 
people haven’t been successes a huge majority of [the] time, so you know 
it’s a difficult dilemma as to how you staff it. . . .  [T]his concept of “I’ll 
be a partner and largely uninvolved and I’ll get my young associate to do 
all the documents,” frankly leads to not as great representation in my 
mind.
  it did not rely on 
creating an associate-heavy entry-level pool; and it resorted to lateral hiring 
early on.  A third partner explained the firm’s approach to hiring and 
promotion: 
190
The standard story of large law firms laments the decline of mentoring 
and training of young associates, and cautions that increasingly competitive 
market conditions, and clients’ increasingly common explicit refusal to pay 
for junior associates’ time, may undermine the future of associates, and 
over time, of large law firms themselves.
 
191  The experience of BHFS 
suggests otherwise.  “I assume that we’ll continue to have young 
associates,”192
BHFS’s specific use of a variety of smart, strategic growth and 
management tools is, of course, explained in great part by its own unique 
circumstances.  Nonetheless, its experience suggests that large law firms 
committed to moving beyond organic growth and management models—
firms that refuse to adopt generic and simplified growth strategies such as 
“go global or perish”—but rather put in place smart, strategic models, stand 
a good chance of defying predictions about their imminent demise.  
Concluded one partner, “[W]e are really coming into our own.”
 noted one partner, explaining that associates are needed 
because as attorneys within the firm grow professionally, they need junior 
lawyers below them who can help utilize their human capital.  And while 
the firm would prefer to laterally recruit third-year associates from large 
law firms, it has also trained its own associates in leanly staffed 
representations. 
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[W]e have [a] national firm experience with local firm rates and staffing.  
I think that’s the other place where we try to distinguish ourselves is that 
partners do your work and senior lawyers do your work and it’s not 
shuttled off to a third or fourth year associate. . . .  [C]lients like it.  They 
love being able to have access to the senior lawyer . . . .  One of the things 
you [have] to balance with that is your associate training and growing 
lawyers because you don’t want a situation where the partner is doing all 
the work and all the young lawyers are doing is diligence and 
xeroxing . . . and we end up a lot of times having young lawyers 
participate in phone calls even though we don’t bill their time . . . .194
Throughout the twentieth century, a rule of thumb for large law firms 
was “grow or die,” or, more accurately, “grow or risk losing prestige and 
market share.”  Large law firms served predominantly large entity clients 
which, faced with increasingly complex bodies of regulation, had growing 
legal needs.  To serve these clients effectively, large law firms needed to 
grow so they could address increased demand for legal services, add 
specializations, and serve their clients around the clock. 
 
In the twenty-first century, as the business world, if not the entire world, 
has become flatter, one might be tempted to think that a similar rule of 
thumb might apply, something along the lines of “grow globally or go 
away,” at least judging from the websites of large law firms that 
increasingly declare the global reach of their subjects.195
Yet it would be premature to conclude that the nationalization and 
globalization of large law firms in the organic sense of growing to establish 
a worldwide presence and workforce is an inevitable and necessary step for 
survival.  Whereas the organic growth of early elite large law firms in the 
twentieth century was, in many ways, a function of increased demand for 
corporate legal services by large entity clients, it is not at all clear that 
similar demand will persist, or that it necessitates the organic growth of 
large law firms.  Some large law firms would find it effective and profitable 
to grow globally by opening offices and by recruiting attorneys from around 
the world with the goal of targeting the business of global entity clients.  
Others will remain (or become) international in the limited sense of serving 
clients all over the world from only one main location in the United States 
or outside of it, with or without the use of a global lawyer workforce via 
out-sourcing and off-shoring.  Yet others will remain mid-size, big enough 
to offer high-end, specialized legal services in complex transactions 
nationally, and perhaps even super-nationally, but not large enough to offer 
worldwide global services of all sorts.  And yet others will choose to remain 
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or become regional actors, offering more localized expertise, within and 
outside the United States.  Ultimately, the fate of large law firms depends 
not on a generic commitment to grow organically, but rather on their ability 
to develop and implement smart strategic growth plans attractive to their 
clients and attuned to their needs. 
 
